The Effects of the Bolshevik Revolution Of 1917: A Case Study

Mason Krebsbach
American Military University

Abstract

The Bolshevik Revolution was the product of combined pressures of starvation, oppression, and the Romanov family's reactive policies during World War I. The Revolution became a source of inspiration, both domestically and internationally. However, while pre- and post-revolutionary Russia have often been explored in terms of social and political change, seldom answered is the question of whether the Bolshevik Revolution lived up to its promises. This paper examines pre-existing case studies in conjunction with original Tsarist- and Soviet-era documents to provide a simple before-and-after comparison of property rights, agricultural and industrial production, infrastructure, education, and healthcare as related to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

Keywords: Bolshevik, Lenin, Stalin, Revolution, Brest-Litovsk, Lysenko, vernalization, famine, Commissariat, Cold War, New Economic Policy, Nobles' Land Bank, Peasants' Land Bank

Los efectos de la revolución bolchevique de 1917: un estudio de caso

Resumen

La Revolución Bolchevique fue el producto de presiones combinadas de hambre, opresión y las políticas reactivas de la familia Romanov durante la Primera Guerra Mundial. La Revolución se convirtió en una fuente de inspiración, tanto a nivel nacional como internacional. Sin embargo, si bien la Rusia prerrevolucionaria y posrevolucionaria a menudo se ha explorado en términos de cambio social y político, rara vez se responde a la pregunta de si la Revolución Bolchevique cumplió sus promesas. Este documento examina estudios de casos preexistentes en conjunto con documentos originales de la era zarista y soviética para proporcionar una comparación simple antes y después de los derechos de propiedad, la producción agrícola e industrial, la infraestructura, la educación y la atención médica en relación con la Revolución Bolchevique. de 1917.

 doi: 10.18278/sshj.8.3.6

Palabras clave: Bolchevique, Lenin, Stalin, Revolución, Brest-Litovsk, Lysenko, vernalización, hambruna, comisariado, guerra fría, nueva política económica, banco de tierras de los nobles, banco de tierras de los campesinos

1917年布尔什维克革命产生的影响：一项案例研究

摘要

布尔什维克革命是由一战期间饥荒、压迫及罗曼诺夫家族的反应式政策三重压力结合而成的产物。此次革命成为了国内和国际研究的源泉。然而，尽管学术经常探究革命前后的俄罗斯所发生的社会和政治变化，但很少有研究回答了布尔什维克革命是否实现了革命承诺这一疑问。本文检验了革命前的案例研究，并结合有关沙皇时代与苏联时代的原始文件，以期对1917年布尔什维克革命前后的产权、农业与工业生产、基础设施、教育、医疗进行简单比较。

关键词：布尔什维克，列宁，斯大林，革命，布列斯特–立陶夫斯克，李森科，春化作用，饥荒，人民委员部，冷战，新经济政策，贵族土地银行, 农民土地银行

Described as an event that "shook the world," the Russian Revolution of 1917 not only marked the end of the Romanov dynasty, but also ushered in Vladimir Lenin and his Bolsheviks of the Marxist Russian Social Democratic Labor Party.[1] In previous years, the causes of the Revolution were associated with poor wages or food scarcities; however, the most important catalyst has been attributed to World War I, in which millions of peasants were called to arms in what they viewed as a war between imperialist nations.[2] Tsar Nicholas II's wartime policies ultimately led to the Russian Army's casualty rate of 40 percent, approximately 200,000 men a month, within thirty months of fighting.[3] These figures ultimately contributed to the attempted resignations of several of Nicholas's officials, thus justifying to the revolutionaries the need to entirely remove the Russian monarchy.[4]

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 presents a unique area of study because of the significant political, social, and historical impact it had on Russian society. A "before and after" comparison is necessary since it is difficult to conceive of a modern Russia without the Revolution, yet the authenticity of histori-

Peasant boy and flax crop near Smolensk, Russia, 1903. North Dakota Agricultural College Experiment Station Bulletin No. 71 (October 1906).

ans' claims remains questionable due to poor recordkeeping or falsification of documents for propaganda purposes. Even so, research shows minor-to-significant benefits of the Bolshevik Revolution in terms of property rights, agricultural production, industrial growth, improved infrastructure, and access to both education and healthcare. Before the Revolution, circumstances enveloping each of the aforementioned were normally very different from the conditions that citizens encountered after the Revolution.

Prior to 1861, the majority of arable land fell under the control of the Russian nobility, with all labor carried out by Russian serfs; however, in February of that year, Aleksandr II Nikolayevich transferred land rights to the peasantry through a mortgage-like process, while compensating the previous landowners and allowing them to maintain one-third of the property.[5] Alexander hoped his reform would lead to modernization and industrialization, but the program was not without problems. Soviet historians assert that agricultural production suffered in part because the state no longer assumed liability, and low-income farmers were either unwilling or simply unable to take any form of financial risk, leading to a restriction in resources.[6]

The Nobles' Land Bank was established in 1885 in order to rescue large estates and encourage land improvements; however, by 1897, the attempted preservation of nobility began to fail by 1897, as government aid programs lost popular support.[7] Additionally, new shareholders found large-scale farming beyond their abilities. A similar approach was again taken in 1883 with the establishment of the Peasants' Land Bank, although the allotted resources were a mere fraction of those held by the Nobles' Land Bank.[8] This

imbalance directly led to the formation of communal farm plots. Immobility had an adverse effect, as households were forced to acquire unanimous approval from communal members prior to exiting the commune. In order to vacate a property, the remaining farmers had to be willing to accept the previous owner's liabilities and debts.[9]

On rare occasions, farmers could sublet their property, occasionally charging more than the possible value of the land, but recordkeeping has made quantifying such occurrences difficult.[10] In 1905, land prices began to soar, making the sale of previously held estates appealing. The amount of land held by nobility fell by one-third in that year (1897) alone.[11] Furthermore, agricultural production suffered a formidable decline during the same time frame.

Grain exports accounted for 40 percent of export earnings from 1870 to 1907, with the exception of 1892. [12] That year was when harvests declined anywhere from 30 to 75 percent, depending on region.[13] An international agricultural crisis that same year had driven crop prices down, and peasants were forced to increase plot sizes. This need came at the expense of both pastures and woodlands, forcing the reduction of livestock—the only source of power and fertilizer—and the removal of forests, causing rapid exhaustion of the soil. Some historians suggest it was the harsh weather of that year, not inadequate farming processes, that caused rapid decreases in agricultural yields, although it may have been the product of both.[14]

Even with production falling due to poor weather, economic policies encouraged the international sale of Russian grain to strengthen the national economy. The Minister of Finance, Ivan Vyshnegradsky, reflected these ambitions in his unofficial motto, "We must go hungry, but we must export."[15] Years later, in 1903, Russia was the leading exporter of barley, oats, wheat, and rye, surpassing American exports; however, despite the overall rise in output per head, the Russian population grew by 25 percent between 1877 and 1905, causing agricultural labor to fall from 74 percent to 72 percent by 1913.[16] Grain prices rose significantly, leading to government-mandated rationing of bread. In February of 1917, soldiers' wives (*soldatki*) took to the streets of Petrograd to protest, inevitably sparking additional protests throughout the country, marking the beginning of the Revolution.[17] Agricultural workers and factory employees alike led factions that ignited the already ripe conditions for a citizens' insurrection.

Although evidence exists, gaps in documentation and poor record management make it hard to accurately analyze industry in pre-1917 Russia. Tsarist resources that were originally intended to dramatically enhance Russian industry comprised a mere fraction of the national military and administrative budgets.[18] Nevertheless, a combination of foreign savings, tariffs, technology adopted from more advanced countries, and permission of private industries all caused significant economic expansion. The years between 1870 and 1890 saw a twenty-five-fold increase in the pro-

duction of coal, a two hundred-fold increase in oil production, and the number of existing railways nearly doubled.[19] Even with significant growth in industry, WWI revealed inabilities to meet production quotas. Factories were unable to mass-produce weaponry and equipment to properly outfit soldiers, contributing to the aforementioned losses. Making matters worse, even if manufacturers had been able to produce more goods, shipping them efficiently to almost anywhere was an inconvenient and arduous challenge. In addition to industrial shortcomings, Russia's own infrastructure displayed integral and substantial flaws.

The first privatized railroad, constructed in 1836, served only a twenty-four-kilometer span between St. Petersburg and what is now Pushkin, and was viewed as economically insignificant at the time. However, it was not until 1851 that the Tsarist government planned, financed, and constructed the first state-sponsored tracks, successfully linking Moscow to St. Petersburg. The decade between 1876 and 1886 was largely an era of inactivity for railway construction, but between the years 1856 and 1876, fifty-five railways received corporate charters.[20] A feud between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Transportation limited transport capacity, and the mix of state and privately owned lines contributed to the Railroad Crisis of 1891-1892, in which 7,481 famine relief boxcars were delayed.

As railways expanded, many of the seasoned state employees left their government positions in pursuit of the higher paying positions within the private sector, gaining freedom to transport whatever goods they chose, and leaving behind management issues within the transport ministry.[21] The total number of functional railways grew from 1,000 kilometers in 1851 to 70,156 in 1913, becoming the second largest railway network in the world.[22] The expanded railways still proved to be insufficient during World War I. Russian soldier Iurii Lomonosov recalled upon his arrival in Tzarskoye Sielo during February 1917 that his group of soldiers had only received 60 percent of their expected rations, but shipments were a mere 20 percent in many other areas. The shortage was due to the reallocation of boxcars to transport wounded men, even though many would freeze to death in the unheated train coaches.

In more destitute areas, the lack of proper supplies forced solders to turn to dead horses for nourishment.[23] The Ministry of Transport simply ignored all reporting of poor rail conditions, telling the men in March 1917: "weakness and insufficiency of equipment on the Russian railroads should be made up for by your unceasing energy. You must have love for your country and consciousness of your role in carrying on transportation for the war and the well-being of the war."[24] The inherent flaws within transportation infrastructure created some challenges in and of themselves, and newly hired hands who were employed to improve the system frequently provided very little in the way of intelligent, resourceful, or innovative enhancements. The vast majority of employees engaged at various ad-

ministrative or manual tiers displayed several unpleasant elements of Russia's pre-revolutionary educational system.

According to the data available, the literacy rate for nobility for the years spanning 1847–1917 expanded from 76 to 90 percent. In comparison, literacy rates among rural estates (peasantry) grew from only 10 to 36 percent.[25] The disparity in this data indicates the effort to limit the education of commoners in the 1800s. Due to peasant demands, local elected councils and churches set up schools, tripling literacy rates in the 1900s. Most state-approved reading materials were designed to enforce discipline, but the eventual increase in literacy made way for publications by fellow peasants, which were then sold by traveling peddlers.[26]

In his 1902 pamphlet, *What is to be Done?,* Lenin reflected upon the rise of uncensored print media in relation to the expansion of socialist ideals, writing "Meanwhile, Marxist books were published one after another, Marxist journals and newspapers were founded, nearly everyone became a Marxist, Marxists were flattered, Marxists were courted, and the book publishers rejoiced at the extraordinary, ready sale of Marxist literature."[27] Although Karl Marx's *Manifesto* had been in print in since 1848, increased literacy and text circulation in the years predating the Revolution increased not only self-awareness, but also increased contention among the common people and government officials. Furthermore, the years of tight censorship taught the literate peasantry to "read between the lines" of state-published media. The identification of exaggerated information made it difficult for the Russian peasantry to accurately assess the impact of famine throughout the country, as most assumed the opposite of what was printed.[28] As the lower class struggled to absorb and mentally digest whatever they were able to read and comprehend, they also had to worry about simply staying healthy and caring for any of their people who were elderly or disadvantaged. Healthcare and social programs before the Bolshevik Revolution were horrific by today's standards.

The Russian famine of 1891–1892 caused the death of 375,000 to 400,000 Russians, through starvation, susceptibility to disease, or infection brought about by malnutrition. Pre-1917, Russia had the one of the world's highest mortality rates, lowest physician-to-civilian ratios, and an almost non-existent pharmaceutical industry.[29] Prior to the famine, Alexander I had attempted to create a famine relief system in 1822, which Nicholas I then modified in 1834. The system was a network of granaries filled with surplus crops from good years, but it was inefficient due to the aforementioned Railway Crisis of 1891–1892. [30]

Setting aside the famine of 1891–1892, there were two underlying truths seldom discussed in relation to citizens' health and healthcare accessibility. The first, with the exception of 1916 and 1917, was the majority of working males were subject to what Lenin referred to as "wage slavery," meaning they were paid a wage just barely capable of sustaining a household but very little else.[31] This data is largely based on

factory inspection reports from 190–1917, with the most detailed statistics coming from the accounting books of textile factories from the years between 1888 and 1916. The low livable wage in Tsarist Russia then contributed to the second undiscussed truth. Allegedly, calorie consumption per head rose between 1860 and 1870, but this assertion is dubious because no differentiation between the wealthy and poor peasants has ever been sufficiently documented, meaning there may be gaps in data collection.[32]

Additional conflicting information may also stem from pre-and post-Soviet Revolution-era data, because Joseph Stalin made several attempts to alter historical accounts as early as 1929, often attempting to boost Russia's image by supplementing documents with his own personal narratives.[33] Overall, however (omitting the famine years), Russian peasants often maintained a diet of 2,500 to 3,500 calories per day.[34] Although far from ideal, noticeable improvement in almost all of these dire aspects of Russian society emerged following the Bolshevik uprising. Land ownership, agricultural production, and industry were the first areas to experience dramatic—and often painful—mutations.

Russia's signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty on March 3, 1918, resulted in the forfeiture of vast industrial territories, the most significant being that of the Ukraine .[35] The secession of largely industrial territories caused a rift between the Bolsheviks and the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, who felt that "the Bolsheviks acted contrary to the interests of the Russian nation and betrayed their allies."[36] The growing rift would later be a contributing factor of the Russian Civil War of 1918–1920, and the Bolshevik policy of "war communism," whereby agricultural products were forcibly removed from peasantry.[37] Those who refused were often executed, with figures estimated at approximately 50,000.[38]

The New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1921 allowed peasants to operate small-scale businesses.[39] However, portions of this policy were later redacted, and privatized lands were once again consolidated under the state, and the people freed from "the burdens of private property would spontaneously cooperate and build a new order."[40] Government officials attempted an all-out collectivization in 1929 and integrated half of the farms in the country into communes within the first three months of the program's initiation.[41] Nevertheless, these actions did not turned out as planned, because many peasants began abandoning plots, destroying equipment, and slaughtering an estimated fifteen million cattle and four million horses.[42] Stalin slowed the collectivization process for a short time, but by 1936, roughly 90 percent of existing farms were integrated into state-run communes.[43] The transformation affected Russian food production both directly and indirectly.

Six years into the American Great Depression, Leon Trotsky published his article, "If America Should Go Communist," in which he stated, "The depression has ravaged your working class and has dealt a crushing blow to

the farmers, who had already been injured by the long agricultural decline of the postwar decade."[44] While he was not entirely incorrect in this observation, he went on to assert that should America go communist, it would "give the farmers, the small tradespeople and businessmen a good long time to think things over and see how well the nationalized section of industry is working."[45] The irony in this statement, although he does acknowledge American communism may differ from Russian communism, is the complete omission of the effects of Russian nationalization of agriculture in the prior decades. Before 1917, agricultural surpluses were retained within the village of origin. In addition to war communistic directives in the early post-revolutionary years, later policies implemented the forced removal of agricultural surpluses from the farming communities.[46]

The forced surrender or sale of produce at prices that were lower than market value led to very poor incentives, to the point that some farmers quit growing grain completely, while others required and accepted state subsidies in order to keep the large communal farms afloat. As production fell, matters worsened due to poor transportation and storage methods that caused massive losses of harvested goods. Poor government practices also contributed to low agricultural yields.

In the 1930s, a Soviet agronomist by the name of Trofim Denisoveich Lysenko claimed that he could "train" spring wheat to become winter wheat by presoaking seeds in low-temperature water prior to planting them later in the year. Lyensko, having no scientific training outside of agriculture, had already made a name for himself within the scientific community due to his questionable theories, yet Soviet agricultural specialists agreed to test his theory of "vernalization." The experiment went into practice without smaller trials, and large crop failures that year directly contributed to the starvation of millions. He would later go on to destroy significant acreage with his theories on fertilization, yet he successfully argued that these failures were beyond his control. Stalin gave into Lyensko's pressure in 1948 and not only fired all geneticists, believing their work was a "bourgeois perversion," but also forbade all further studies on biology and genetics in the USSR.[47] By the 1980s, Russia was dependent on foreign grains. The post-revolutionary disasters of agriculture shortly after the uprising took place at roughly the same time, and for similar reasons, as the industrial sector went through marked transitions. Overall, however, industry displayed much better results.

The signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty damaged industrial and manufacturing in large part because of the loss of the Ukraine, whose output offered Russia independence from German natural resources.[48] Nevertheless, Lenin and his cabinet saw fit to immediately begin an era of expansion. Unlike the rural masses, industrial workers were promised bread and potatoes, leading to significant industrial growth.[49] As Russian industry grew, factory workers evolved into an army of

machinists, textile workers, press break operators, or whatever skilled labor the state required. The cabinet eliminated previously held private initiatives, and wages were largely equalized.[50] The years leading up to World War II yielded the most significant industrial expansion. Russia's coal output grew to levels 5.5 times than that of 1913, while iron had expanded to three times, and oil 3.2 times. If consumer goods are also taken into consideration, the overall industrial sector grew somewhere between three and six times larger than pre-revolution industries.[51]

Germany's invasion of Russia in 1941 forced the relocation of both military and civilian factories to the nation's interior. Many of those formerly dedicated to the production of civilian goods were converted into munitions and other wartime facilities, where they began averaging monthly outputs of 700 aircraft, 230 tanks, 4,000 mortars, and a million shells.[52] Unlike the factories of World War I, Russian industrial capabilities of World War II surpassed those of its foes. Following the impressive growth in industry, post-revolutionary Russia instituted major upgrades in infrastructure, education, and healthcare.

The majority of Russian railway equipment prior to the Bolshevik Revolution had been purchased from American companies, as pre-1917 Russia lacked the necessary manufacturing capabilities. The American government banned sales of this equipment in 1918, specifically due to the Revolution, forcing the Bolsheviks to explore various other avenues of production. Further complicating the situation was Russia's unwillingness to adapt their 1524-millimeter tracks to fit the European gauge of 1435 millimeters due to security issues.[53] Despite these initial drawbacks, post-revolutionary Russia experienced the reconditioning of seventy pre-existing locomotives, the addition of 1200 foreign locomotives and 1500 tankers, and the production of 80,000 tons of rail.[54] The growth of infrastructure was significant and extremely helpful to urban and rural citizens alike. It also contributed to the increased distribution of educational resources.

The fall of the Tsarist regime quickly brought to light the general public's ignorance of science, literature, fine arts, and the evolving components of socialism. By 1920, literacy rates among rural populations measured 52 percent, with urban rates at approximately 80 percent; however, available data leading to 1926 accounted for those with very a basic understanding of reading and writing, while later censuses focused on Russians with some form of secondary education.[55] In an attempt to create a Russia that could compare with global elites, state-owned publishing houses printed vast amounts of classical and contemporary literature. Most early poets supported the Soviet government and socialized programs, but later authors with anti-communist sentiments were censored, imprisoned, or killed. The USSR constitution of 1936 introduced a means of making education available to all, regardless of gender, income, ethnicity, or religion.

Although literacy and education in Soviet Russia surpassed that of the Tsarist era, education only magnified

class distinctions between the rich and the poor.[56] Both urban and rural populations had achieved an average literacy rate of ninety-nine percent by 1979.[57] Nevertheless, socialized education was not entirely "free," and the quality was questionable. The practice of school psychiatry, then known as pedology, or the study of children, emerged in the 1920s, but it was banned by state decree in 1936 due to criticisms that it encouraged individual differences and discredited social influence in childhood development. With this decree, standardized tests became forbidden, as they were viewed as a means to favor children from affluent families.[58] In the long run, however, both infrastructure and educational enhancements eventually boosted pre-revolutionary levels of health care, while invoking an entirely new set of problems.

Within a year of the Revolution, the Bolsheviks created the People's Commissariat of Health Protection to manage all aspects of health. This encompassed institutions, research and development, birth control, manufacture and distribution of pharmaceuticals, and medical training. Additionally, the pre-revolutionary era had suffered low literacy rates, causing ignorance of basic hygiene and sanitation practices, which invariably led to further infections and/or health complications. The commissariat remedied this problem through the creation of health-related propaganda.[59] Improvements in infrastructure allowed for progress in pre-existing famine relief; however, relief was deliberately denied to the peasantry between 1932 and 1933 and any mention of the famine was deemed a crime against the state. All rations allocated to factory workers were controlled by the state as a means to improve productivity.[60]

The Cold War Era brought health problems entirely different from those found in pre-revolutionary Russia. Mortality rates had dropped, placing Russia 32nd internationally, and infectious disease, malnutrition, and poor hygiene were replaced by alcoholism, drug abuse, and tobacco usage as the leading causes of death. The solution was a multi-faceted approach. First, alcohol prices were increased by 25 percent, followed by a 32 percent reduction in the production of vodka and a 68 percent decrease for wine. The final approach was heavy fines for those accused of producing shoddy goods. Although this era saw a significant drop in alcohol-related deaths, from 47,300 in 1984 to 20,800 in 1986, these two years also yielded 11,000 deaths from the consumption of alcohol substitutes. Furthermore, all factors implemented in conjunction with one another did little to prevent the increasing deaths from lung cancer, which rose significantly between the years 1965 and 1985 alone.[61] Along with property rights, agricultural output, industrial production, infrastructure, and education, healthcare initially seemed to have simply traded one set of problems for another. On the other hand, such a narrowly defined judgment is hasty and over-simplified.

Attempting to answer the question of whether or not life in Russia im-

proved after the Bolshevik Revolution requires specified metrics of comparison. This article evaluates land ownership, agricultural production, industry, infrastructure, education, and healthcare in the years before and after 1917. The Bolshevik Revolution removed forcibly eliminated privately held farm plots, thus negating land rights previously granted to the Russian peasantry. Granted, the rural population had suffered famine as the product of poor farming practices decades earlier, but communal farms, the lack of incentives, pseudo-science, and misguided Soviet policies led to famine, a decrease in agricultural output, and recession.

The industrial sector cannot be analyzed based on production alone simply because it was still in its infancy under the Romanovs, and accurate record maintenance was almost non-existent. One could speculate that increased government interest and investment could have served as a catalyst of growth as it did under both Lenin and Stalin, but there was some growth prior to 1917, albeit slow. However, industry under Bolshevik polices far surpassed that of industry under Tsarist policies. Additionally, infrastructure also presents a difficult comparison. Existing data shows that railways in the early 1900s were documented in kilometers, while documentation of growth after 1918 measures tonnage of manufactured rails and the addition of railcars and engines. If rail tonnage and train car equipment are the main comparisons, post-revolution infrastructure once again surpassed that under the previous system.

Noted earlier is that documented education rates are flawed due to unequal comparisons. Early Russians were considered literate if they possessed rudimentary reading and writing skills, while communist Russians were considered literate only if they possessed secondary education. Even so, late Russia claimed a literacy rate of 99 percent. If this data and the previous statements are true, this means that of those surveyed, 99 percent of Soviets possessed some form of higher education, while only 36 percent of peasantry and 76 percent of nobility possessed basic skills under the Romanovs. Although Russia's state-run schools may be credited with increased literacy rates in the post-revolution years, approved materials were highly censored and intended mainly to teach students about the importance of the state.

Finally, there is the aspect of healthcare. The Bolsheviks took a country with a non-existent healthcare network and one of the highest mortality rates in the world and implemented a socialized health system. Even at its most basic, rudimentary healthcare is still better than non-existent healthcare. These efforts may have been diminished in later years due to famine, intentional withholding of aid, alcoholism, and drug abuse. Simply put, some aspects of Russian life improved under the Bolsheviks, such as access to healthcare and education, industrial expansion, and growth in infrastructure. Conversely, other property rights and agricultural practices became worse in the years following 1917. Making a case for overall quality of life, significant

improvements in four out of five social and/or economic areas translates into a notable enhancement in the overall quality of life for most Russian citizens following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

Bibliography

Acton, Edward. *Russia: The Tsarist and Soviet Legacy*. 2nd ed. London: Longman, 1995.

Badcock, Sarah. "Women, Protest, and Revolution: Soldiers' Wives in Russia during 1917." *International Review of Social History* 49 (2004): 47–70. doi:10.1017/S0020859003001366.

Bennett, M. K. "Food and Agriculture in the Soviet Union, 1917–48." *Journal of Political Economy* 57, no. 3 (1949): 185–98. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1826125.

Borodkin, Leonid, Brigitte Granville, and Carol Scott Leonard. "The Rural/urban Wage Gap in the Industrialisation of Russia, 1884–1910." *European Review of Economic History* 12, no. 1 (April 2008): 67–95. doi:10.1017/S1361491608002116.

Canir, Cristian. "The Allied Punishment and Attempted Socialisation of the Bolsheviks (1917-1924): An English School Approach." *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 4 (2011): 1967–94. doi:10.1017/S026021051000150.

Caulkins, Janet. *Joseph Stalin*. New York: F. Watts, 1990.

Cheremukhin, Anton, Mikhail Golosov, Sergei Guriev, and Aleh Tsyvinski. "The Industrialization and Economic Development of Russia through the Lens of a Neoclassical Growth Model." *The Review of Economic Studies* 84, no. 2 (April 1, 2017): 613–49. doi:10.1093/restud/rdw026.

Crozier, Brian. *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire*. Rocklin, CA: Prima, 2000.

Dmitriev, Timofey. "Max Weber and Peter Struve on the Russian Revolution." *Studies in East European Thought* 69, no. 4 (December 2017): 305–28. doi:10.1007/s11212-017-9294-9.

Gindis, Boris. "Professional School Psychology in the Soviet Union: Current Status, Problems, and Perspectives." *School Psychology Quarterly* 6, no. 3 (1991): 186–99. doi:/10.1037/h0088813.

Gronowicz, Anthony. "The Global Significance of the Russian Revolution: Imperialism and the Socialist Resistance." *Journal of Labor and Society* 20, no. 3 (September 2017): 349–72. doi:10.1111/wusa.12300.

Harrison, Mark. "'Barbarossa': The Soviet Response, 1941." *Academia.edu*. Accessed June 7, 2018. http://www.academia.edu/18141932/_Barbarossa_The_Soviet_Response_1941.

Heywood, Anthony. *Modernising Lenin's Russia: Economic Reconstruction, Foreign Trade and the Railways*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Kagan, Frederick W. and Robin D.S. Higham. *The Military History of Tsarist Russia*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2008.

Khaustova, Ekaterina. 2018. "Pre-Revolution Living Standards: Russia 1888–1917." Paper presented at the *Annual Conference of the Economic History Society,* Moscow, Russian Federation, April 2013.

Krementsov, Nikolai. "The Promises, Realities, and Legacies of the Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–2017." *American Journal of Public Health* 107, no. 11 (November 1, 2017): 1693–94. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2017.304092._

Lenin, Vladimir. *What Is to Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement.* Mansfield Centre, CT: Martino Fine Books, 2013.

———. *State and Revolution*. Portsmouth, NH: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2018.

Lomonosov, Iurii V. *Memoirs of the Russian Revolution*. Miami, FL: HardPress Publishing, 2012.

Mathias, Peter. *Agriculture and Industrialization: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present Day*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.

Mentzel, Peter C. "Chaos and Utopia: The Anarchists in the Russian Revolution and Civil War." *Independent Review* 22, no. 2 (2017): 173–81.

Mezhuev, Vadim M. "The Russian Revolution in the Contemporary Context." *Russian Studies in Philosophy* 55, nos. 3-4 (July 4, 2017): 227–38. doi:10.1080/10611967.2017.1370298.

Mironov, Boris N. "The Development of Literacy in Russia and the USSR from the Tenth to the Twentieth Centuries." *History of Education Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (1991): 229–52. doi:10.2307/368437.

Nafziger, Steven. 2012. Serfdom, Emancipation, and Off-Farm Labour Mobility in Tsarist Russia. *Economic History of Developing Regions* 27, no. 1 (2012): 1–37. doi:10.1080/20780389.2012.682377.

Owen, Thomas C. "Measuring Business Cycles in the Russian Empire: Measuring Business Cycles." *The Economic History Review* 66, no. 3 (2013): 895–916. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0289.2012.00673.

Qualls, Karl D. "The Russian Revolutions: The Impact and Limitations of Western Influence." *Dickinson College Faculty Publications*. Paper 8, 2003. http://scholar.dickinson.edu/faculty_publications/8

Robbins, Richard G. *Famine in Russia, 1891-1892: The Imperial Government Responds to a Crisis*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975.

Soyfer, Valery. "The Consequences of Political Dictatorship for Russian Science." *Nature Reviews. Genetics* 2, no. 9 (September 1, 2001): 723–29. doi:10.1038/35088598

Trotsky, Leon. *If America Should Go Communist*. New York, NY: Pioneer Press, 1957.

Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie. "Rossiia v Mirovoi Voine, 1914–1918." *Goda (v Tsifrakh).* Moscow, 1925, 17.

Notes

1 Anthony Gronowicz, "The Global Significance of the Russian Revolution: Imperialism and the Socialist Resistance," *Journal of Labor and Society* 20, no. 3 (September 2017): 350. doi:10.1111/wusa.12300.

2 Timofey Dmitriev, "Max Weber and Peter Struve on the Russian Revolution," *Studies in East European Thought* 69, no. 4 (December 2017): 305–28. doi:10.1007/s11212-017-9294-9

3 Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, "Rossiia v Mirovoi Voine, 1914–1918," *Goda (v Tsifrakh)* (Moscow, 1925), 17.

4 Frederick W. Kagan and Robin D.S. Higham, *The Military History of Tsarist Russia* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2008), 243.

5 Steven Nafziger, "Serfdom, Emancipation, and Off-Farm Labour Mobility in Tsarist Russia," *Economic History of Developing Regions* 27, no. 1 (2012): 15. doi:10.1080/20780389.2012.682377.

6 Ibid., 6.

7 Edward Acton, *Russia: The Tsarist and Soviet Legacy,* 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1995), 99.

8 Ibid., 102.

9 Nafziger, "Serfdom, Emancipation, and Off-Farm Labour Mobility," 5.

10 Ibid., 7.

11 Acton, *Russia,* 99.

12 Ibid., 101.

13 Richard G. Robbins, *Famine in Russia, 1891-1892: The Imperial Government Responds to a Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 2.

14 James Y. Simms, "The Crop Failure of 1891: Soil Exhaustion, Technological Backwardness, and Russia's 'Agrarian Crisis,'" *Slavic Review* 41, no. 2 (July 1, 1982): 239. doi:10.2307/2496341.

15 Acton, 101.

16 Ibid., 103.

17 Sarah Badcock, "Women, Protest, and Revolution: Soldiers' Wives in Russia during 1917," *International Review of Social History* 49, (2004): 47–70. doi:10.1017/S0020859003001366.

18 Acton, 103.

19 Leonid Borodkin, Brigitte Granville, and Carol Scott Leonard, "The Rural/Urban Wage Gap in the Industrialisation of Russia, 1884–1910," *European Review of Economic History* 12, no. 1 (April 2008): 67–95. doi:10.1017/S1361491608002116.

20 Thomas C. Owen, "Measuring Business Cycles in the Russian Empire: Measuring Business Cycles," The Economic History Review 66, no. 3 (2013): 899. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0289.2012.00673.

21 Robbins, *Famine in Russia,* 79.

22 Owen, "Measuring Business Cycles in the Russian Empire," 899.

23 Iurii V. Lomonosov, *Memoirs of the Russian Revolution* (Miami, FL: HardPress Publishing, 2012), 7.

24 Ibid., 21.

25 Boris N. Mironov, "The Development of Literacy in Russia and the USSR from the Tenth to the Twentieth Centuries," *History of Education Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (1991): 242. https://doi.org/10.2307/368437.

26 Acton, 99–103.

27 Vladimir Il'ič Lenin, *What Is to Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement* (Mansfield Centre, CT: Martino Fine Books, 2013), 20.

28 Robbins, 65.

29 Nikolai Krementsov, "The Promises, Realities, and Legacies of the Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-2017," *American Journal of Public Health* 107, no. 11 (November 1, 2017): 1693–94. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2017.304092.

30 Robbins, 19.

31 Vladimir Lenin, *State and Revolution* (Portsmouth, NH: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform. 2018), 84.

32 Acton, 101.

33 Janet Caulkins, *Joseph Stalin* (New York: F. Watts, 1990), 70.

34 Ekaterina Khaustova, "Pre-Revolution Living Standards: Russia 1888-1917," April 2013. http://www.ehs.org.uk/dotAsset/62d8a367-8beb-4dd0-b21f-d98b425c6ef3.pdf.

35 Acton, 179

36 Cristian Cantir, "The Allied Punishment and Attempted Socialisation of the Bolsheviks (1917–1924): An English School Approach," *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 4 (2011): 1982. doi:10.1017/S0260210510000150

37 Vadim M. Mezhuev, "The Russian Revolution in the Contemporary Context," *Russian Studies in Philosophy* 55, nos. 3-4 (2017): 230. doi:10.1080/10611967.2017.137029

38 Caulkins, *Joseph Stalin,* 58.

39 Anton Cheremukhin, Mikhail Golosov, Sergei Guriev, and Aleh Tsyvinski, "The Industrialization and Economic Development of Russia through the Lens of a Neoclassical Growth Model," *The Review of Economic Studies* 84, no. 2 (April 1, 2017): 613. doi:10.1093/restud/rdw026.

40 Peter C. Mentzel, "Chaos and Utopia: The Anarchists in the Russian Revolution and Civil War," *Independent Review* 22, no. 2 (2017): 175.

41 Peter Mathias, *Agriculture and Economic Growth from the Eighteenth Century to the Present* (Blackwell: Oxford, 1996), 199.

42 Caulkins, 80.

43 Mathias, *Agriculture and Economic Growth,* 195.

44 Leon Trotsky, *If America Should Go Communist* (New York, NY: Pioneer Press, 1957), 10.

45 Ibid.

46 Mathias, 194.

47 Valery Soyfer, "The Consequences of Political Dictatorship for Russian Science," *Nature Reviews. Genetics* 2, no. 9 (September 1, 2001): 723–29. doi:10.1038/35088598.

48 Acton, 179.

49 Mathias, 199.

50 Mezhuez, "The Russian Revolution," 235.

51 M.K. Bennett, "Food and Agriculture in the Soviet Union, 1917–48," *Journal of Political Economy* 57, no. 3(1949): 185–98. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1826125.

52 Mark Harrison, "'Barbarossa': The Soviet Response, 1941," *Academia.edu*, accessed June 7, 2018. http://www.academia.edu/18141932/_Barbarossa_The_Soviet_Response_1941.

53 Anthony Heywood, *Modernising Lenin's Russia: Economic Reconstruction, Foreign Trade and the Railways* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 16.

54 Ibid., 210–11.

55 Mironov, "The Development of Literacy in Russia," 243.

56 Karl D. Qualls, "The Russian Revolutions: The Impact and Limitations of Western Influence," Dickinson College Faculty Publications. Paper 8, 2003. http://scholar.dickinson.edu/faculty_publications/8.

57 Mironov, 243.

58 Boris Gindis, "Professional School Psychology in the Soviet Union: Current Status, Problems, and Perspectives," *School Psychology Quarterly* 6 no. 3 (1991): 186–99. doi:10.1037/h0088813.

59 Krementsov, "The Promises, Realities, and Legacies of the Bolshevik Revolution," 1693–94.

60 Caulkins, 81.

61 Brian Crozier, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire* (Rocklin, CA: Prima, 2000), 405.