

There is No Such Animal: The Corps of Intelligence Police

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ABSTRACT

During the scramble for mobilization and deployment of dough-boys to France during World War I, Military Intelligence personnel in France made an astute observation. The U.S. Army had no mechanism to defend against enemy agents attempting to subvert its ranks. This need gave birth to the Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP). However, despite the overwhelming amount of personnel drafted into the Army, the CIP struggled to fill its allotted strength. Why did the Corps of Intelligence Police struggle to find suitable candidates despite the influx of personnel into the Army during World War I with the necessity of counterintelligence?

Keywords: Intelligence, Counterintelligence, First World War, Espionage, Military Intelligence Corps of Intelligence Police, U.S. Army, Subversion

No existe tal animal: el cuerpo de policía de inteligencia

RESUMEN

Durante la lucha por la movilización y el despliegue de soldados en Francia durante la Primera Guerra Mundial, el personal de inteligencia militar en Francia hizo una observación astuta. El Ejército de los EE. UU. no tenía ningún mecanismo para defenderse de los agentes enemigos que intentaban subvertir sus filas. Esta necesidad dio origen al Cuerpo de Policía de Inteligencia (CIP). Sin embargo, a pesar de la abrumadora cantidad de personal reclutado en el Ejército, el CIP luchó para llenar su fuerza asignada. ¿Por qué el Cuerpo de Policía de Inteligencia luchó para encontrar candidatos adecuados a pesar de la afluencia de personal al Ejército durante la Primera Guerra Mundial con la necesidad de contrainteligencia?

Palabras clave: Inteligencia, Contrainteligencia, Primera Guerra Mundial, Espionaje, Cuerpo de Inteligencia Militar de la Policía de Inteligencia, Ejército de EE. UU., Subversión

不存在这样的人：情报警察部队

摘要

第一次世界大战中，在美国努力动员和部署士兵前往法国期间，法国的军事情报人员进行了敏锐的观察。面临试图颠覆其队伍的敌方特工，美国陆军没有防御机制。这一需求催生了情报警察部队（CIP）。不过，尽管有大量人员被征召入伍，CIP仍然在填充其人力一事上面临困难。为何在第一次世界大战期间，尽管大量人员因反情报之需而涌入军队，但情报警察部队仍然难以找到合适的候选人？

关键词：情报，反情报，第一次世界大战，间谍活动，军事情报，情报警察部队，美国陆军，颠覆

Introduction

In 1917, the United States entered World War I on the Allied side. Before the declaration of war, the United States, notably the Army, did not adequately prepare for war. In the scramble for mobilization and deployment of doughboys to France, the Military Intelligence section already made an astute observation. The Army had no mechanism to defend against enemy agents attempting to subvert its ranks. As such, Major Dennis E. Nolan “asked for fifty secret servicemen who have had training in police work and speak French fluently.”¹ However, despite the overwhelming amount of personnel drafted into the Army, the newly formed Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP) struggled to fill its allotted strength. Why did the Corps of Intelligence Police struggle to find suitable candidates despite the influx of personnel into the Army during World War I with the necessity of Counterintelligence?

Intelligence professionals often do not know the history of their discipline. For example, the entire document entitled *Combat Service of Organizations of the United States Army in the World War* published in 1931 does not even mention Intelligence, despite mentioning other non-combat branches such as the Medical Corps.² The secretive nature of covert operations is one part of the reason. Contained within the intelligence community are the sub-communities of the various intelligence disciplines, such as Counterintelligence. If the intelligence community knows little about its past, the counterintelligence community knows even less of its distinct history. Additionally, Counterintelligence occupies a strange space in the intelligence community; it is simultaneously law enforcement and Intelligence. Exploring the Corps of Intelligence Police can help one to understand the Counterintelligence’s current role better.

After an examination of American counterintelligence throughout history this article will break down the initial question by asking these follow-up questions: To what extent did a German espionage threat exist within the ranks of the American Expeditionary Force? And why did Dennis Nolan want the Corps of Intelligence Police recruits to have specific skills similar to police officers? Ultimately despite the massive influx of personnel into the Army, the Corps of Intelligence Police struggled to find qualified personnel. The pay was not sufficient, the standards were too specific, and training was unavailable due to the ad hoc nature of American Military Intelligence.

American Counterintelligence throughout History

“**A**t the outbreak of the war in Europe, neither the U.S. Justice Department’s Bureau of Investigation (forerunner of the FBI) nor the Treasury Department’s Secret Service yet had significant experience of counter espionage.”³ Indeed, the U.S. Army had had no experience in counterintelligence since the U.S. Civil War, against an enemy that spoke the same language and had a similar culture. The most successful example of U.S. counterespionage before World War I was with General George Washington during the American Revolutionary War. As such when one studies all subsequent eras of U.S. intelligence history, it is characterized by the adherence to the reinvention of the wheel and a lack of continuity.



Image 1. Corps of Intelligence Police Button. Photo Credit: US Army

Authors Raymond Faunt and Alexander Rose examined American espionage and counter espionage during the Revolutionary War. Most readers are likely familiar with Nathan Hale, who the British executed for spying with his statue outside of the CIA headquarters in Langley, VA. However, lesser-known intelligence operatives such as Benjamin Tallmadge also were serving the Continental cause by running the successful Culper Ring. Even less known is the Continental counterintelligence capability. As Faunt states, “The premier defensive CI organization of the war was not assigned to the Continental Army; it was a civilian organization headed by John Jay for the state of New York, known as the Commission for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies.”⁴ However, the Commander and Chief of the Continental Army eventually was able to provide his Army a CI capability.

Unlike his British advisories and, to an extent, his American contemporaries, Washington understood the necessity of Intelligence. Rose summarizes this nicely by stating the following: “Until Arnold’s recruitment, British intelligence operations had lagged behind Washington’s, who Culper Ring surpassed anything Clinton, let alone General Howe, had constructed. Washington, too, appreciated the craft of Intelligence far more than did Clinton (or other senior commanders), and naturally grasped the need to acquire reports from myriad, often contradictory sources behind the lines, to cross-reference their information to distinguish between fact and fiction, to analyze and evaluate their timeliness and utility before acting. Washington understood that authentic intelligence-gathering consists, not of flash derring-do and glammers escapes, but of piecing together an intricate, yet most tedious, jigsaw where every fact could be interpreted in several different ways.”⁵ However, despite his successes with the Culper Ring, the most glaring counterintelligence issue remained with the turning of General Arnold.

Being in tune with the CI failure Arnold’s betrayal, Washington adjusted afterward. Faunt states, “Washington trained Continental soldiers in the area of tactical Intelligence, or site/personnel exploitation. Soldiers on guard and picket duty were trained to inspect people entering and leaving friendly lines thoroughly; this simple measure often yielded crucial information or revealed spies with incriminating intelligence documents. When it came to defensive

CI operations, Washington was smart enough to use all the tools available to him. One of those tools was a civilian defensive CI organization, the type of which Washington had ruefully written about on March 24, 1776, to Colonel Josiah Quincy.”⁶ The Continental Army never again faced such a colossal CI failure during the remainder of the War, thanks in large part to the diligence of George Washington and his intelligence staff.

While the Continental Army leveraged Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence, the US Army again had to reinvent the wheel of counterespionage during the U.S. Civil War. David M. Keithly provides the following assessment of the failure of U.S. intelligence during the Civil War: “Ultimately, we must attribute intelligence shortfalls to a general lack of preparedness in America for large-scale conflict and to a decentralized political system with an ineffective executive branch of government. If President Davis himself could take the time to question a suspected operative, then quite apparently little time and effort and few resources were being devoted to the administration of Confederate intelligence and counterintelligence operations. The Civil War was fought by hundreds of thousands of troops in America’s age of innocence. As often as not, it was conducted in an informal, haphazard manner. Fire, sword, and War came suddenly to an America that understood too little of such things. Likewise, Intelligence was also in its age of innocence. Had it been otherwise, the manner of the War’s conduct would not have been so haphazard. Had it been

otherwise, perhaps far fewer would have fought, suffered, and died. If history offers any lesson, this is it.”⁷

While Keithley is harsh in his criticism, U.S. military intelligence is characterized by a lack of continuity. For example, the document entitled *Regulations for Intelligence Duties in the Field* produced by the War Office in 1904 indicates that Intelligence is something a general officer conducts in the Field instead of a permanent fixture of a field army. There is no mention of specific individuals trained for the role of intelligence or how to train these soldiers. Paragraph 3 states, “As soon as the Army takes the Field, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief will have entire control of the whole of the field Intelligence, and he may arrange or alter the composition or distribution of the personnel employed on intelligence duties, both officers and men, in such manner as from local or other conditions he may consider advisable to ensure the efficient and economical performance of intelligence services. He may also arrange for any necessary increase in the military strength of the Intelligence staff. He may authorize the enlistment or engagement of such local assistance as may be required and available. He will authorize and control all expenditure on Intelligence and secret service.”⁸ Additionally, throughout this document, there is no mention of counterespionage or counter sabotage.

Despite not making provisions for Counterintelligence, the term “intelligence police” appears in the manual. Paragraph 33 states, “Intelligence police

may consist of military police attached to the Intelligence Corps, of a specially selected body of soldiers, or of men specially enlisted.”⁹ Dennis Nolan likely was familiar with this document given his use of “intelligence police” and his enlistment of specific personnel. However, in 1904 this version of intelligence police had the following duties:

“The intelligence Police will—

- a) Prevent all unauthorized persons from gaining access to the offices or camps of the officer engaged in intelligence duties.
- b) They will take charge of all persons brought to the field intelligence examination.
- c) They will carry out such arrests or searches as may be ordered for intelligence purposes by staff officers for Intelligence.
- d) They will act as guards over such documents or other articles as may be placed in their care.
- e) They will act as special messengers within our lines, when communications have to be sent by hand.”¹⁰

In this way, they acted more like a combination of contemporary security managers and military police rather than a proto version of Counterintelligence agents. Additionally, the manual makes the following provision, “When a campaign takes place in British territory or in a country where the inhabitants or a portion of them, are friendly, it may be possible to arrange that the duties of intelligence police should be



Image 2. Photograph of Dennis Nolan. Photo Credit: US Army

carried out by the guides, scouts, and c., of the Intelligence corps.”¹¹ Having more or less any soldier performing the function of intelligence police is the opposite of the Corps of Intelligence Police’s requirements during the AEF’s time in France. However, the manual from 1904’s provisions that recruitment could occur from outside units would have alleviated some of the staffing issues that the CIP faced.

By 1916, the U.S. Army recognized the need for a counterespionage function within its ranks. However, Army officials did not see a need for specialized agents or soldiers to con-

duct this duty. The manual entitled *Instructions for the Organization and Maintenance of the Counter-Espionage Service within Military Units* expressly states the following: “First of all it must be defiantly understood that Counter Espionage is not a separate branch of the service, but it is a function which each military unit must perform for itself, just as it provides its own guard. The Military Intelligence Division, General Staff, is charged with the duty of instructing Intelligence Officers and coordinating their work, but it cannot perform their duties.”¹² As with the manual from 1904, the attitude re-

mained of a decentralized intelligence function. However, this 1916 manual drops the naivety of the former and does not include special provisions for friendly countries. Additionally, the espionage threat of any potential enemy is also correctly recognized. Paragraph 4 advises its reader: "The Counter-Espionage Service is now in actual conflict with the enemy in the United States, and the multifarious activities of enemy agents constitute a most serious menace to the accomplishment of our mission in the war."¹³ From reading these two documents, one can see the lineage that led to the CIP and the formation of a standard counterintelligence service during World War I.

The German Threat

As this article previously mentioned, "Soon after he arrived in Europe, Maj. Dennis E. Nolan, Pershing's intelligence officer, had become concerned about the possible security problems faced by American troops fighting on foreign soil."¹⁴ However, to what extent were Dennis Nolan's fears justified enough to form the Corps of Intelligence Police? Given the extensive work of German saboteurs during the First World War, especially in Russia, Dennis Nolan was correct in informing the Corps of Intelligence Police in response to the heavy German sabotage effort and German Intelligence's success in operating within the United States before American entry into the First World War.

Christopher Andrew provides the best overview of Intelligence during

the First World War and the period beforehand in his monograph *The Secret World: A History of Intelligence*. The European powers, mainly the British, worried about the newly formed German Empire just before 1914. For example, "the revival of British Intelligence five years before the First World War was prompted by the naval rivalry with Germany. Following the 1907 Triple Entente with Britain's former imperial rivals, France and Russia, both later wartime allies, the main threat to British security came from the expanding German High Seas Fleet."¹⁵ If one can characterize the period after World War II as the "Red Scare," then the period just before World War I is "the German Scare." Indeed, the German Fleet posed a threat to British security; however, it is on land and with her Army's capabilities in which Germany distinguished herself in both World Wars. Additionally, German Military Intelligence posed a distinct threat to the Allied combat operations on especially in the East.

On the Eastern Front, German Intelligence distinguished itself against their Russian adversaries. In contrast, "during the opening weeks of the First World War, Russia paid a heavy price for its prewar failure to coordinate foreign and military intelligence."¹⁶ At the Battle of Tannenberg, Russia suffered a titanic defeat at the hands of Germany, primarily due to German Intelligence. "Tannenberg was the greatest German victory of the War. It was also a turning point in the history of German Intelligence. For the first time since unification Germany acquired a SIGINT agency." Interestingly, the Russians

completely misinterpreted the German SIGINT capability, which led to their defeat at Tannenberg. “The massive Russian defeats on the Eastern Front before the Brusilov offensive, combined with evidence of German foreknowledge of Russian troop movements, were widely blamed on huge (but non-existent) networks of German spies. It never occurred to the man Russians addicted to spy mania that German intelligence success on the Eastern Front was based on SIGINT rather than espionage.”¹⁷ However, the Russians are not the only power to succumb to this line of thinking. “The spy manias of the First World War showed how little the public in all combatant countries, in many cases misled by spy novels, understood about the role of Intelligence. Governments, themselves sometimes subject to spy scares, understood public hysteria about espionage so little largely because, as in intelligence matters generally, they lacked historical perspective.”¹⁸ Contemporary readers should see a striking similarity in a lack of understanding between modern countries and their counterparts over 100 years ago in intelligence matters. As such, this paper will examine German Intelligence and the Western Front.

“On the Western Front, the main intelligence innovation at the outbreak of the war was aerial reconnaissance, first attempted half a century earlier, with little success, by the Balloon Corps during the American Civil War.”¹⁹ While not as impressive as their victory at Tannenberg, the Germans also had intelligence success in this regard on the Western front. “When the Germans

began their great offensive at Verdun on February 21, 1916, they achieved total surprise. The combination of bad weather, German deception, and the superiority of Fokker Eindecker fighters deprive the French of effective aerial reconnaissance before the battle.”²⁰ While the Germans did achieve total surprise at Verdun, they never succeeded in penetrating deeply enough into French territory to end French involvement, as they accomplished during the Second World War. The brutal trench warfare of the Western Front is analyzed better in other works and is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the Germans had some success in tapping into the British telephone lines on the Western Front, indicating a willingness to continue to use Intelligence.

“The distinguishing feature of Germany’s wartime intelligence operation was the priority given to sabotage ... German military Intelligence established a sabotage department, *Sektion P*, under Captain Rudolf Nadolny. Falkenhayn awarded Nadolny the Iron Cross for his success in blowing up a Russian gunpowder factor at Octa on the outskirts of Petrograd (as St Petersburg was remained during wartime)”²¹ and again demonstrating the German superiority in Intelligence over the Russians during the First World War. The crowning achievement for German military Intelligence over the Russians was sneaking Lenin back into Russia from Switzerland. The ultimate consequence of this operation was removing Russia from World War I, thus freeing the German forces on the Eastern Front to be reallocated to the Western Front.

In 1917, Vladimir Lenin was living in Switzerland due to his banishment by the Russian courts. While his existence wasn't the most comfortable, as he lived above a slaughterhouse, he was safe to continue his Marxist writing. When revolutionaries overthrew the Tsar in March, Lenin was ecstatic and intended to return to Russia. However, he had no means to travel from Switzerland to Petrograd. The British and French were not going to aid him as he was an outspoken critic of the war, and any potential loss of their Eastern Ally would hinder their war aims of defeating Germany. Lenin found an unlikely beneficiary in the German high command, whose soldiers had killed thousands of Russians of all classes. Due to ongoing combat on the Eastern front and a lack of infrastructure, if Lenin wanted to return to Russia had had to go through Germany. The Germans sent numerous telegrams to Switzerland through German Foreign Minister Zimmerman's office. During negotiations, both parties reached the following agreement about the nature of Lenin's travel through Germany: "... A neutral, would act as the contact between the passengers (Lenin) and their German guards, and no one would enter the exiles carriage without permission. As far as possible, the carriage was to travel without stops, and it minuted that no passengers could be ordered to leave. There would be no control of passports and no discrimination against political passengers on the grounds of their political views."²² German intelligence and high command looked at this gamble to upend the Russian state. Happily, they

accepted the risk of Lenin traveling through the German Empire. Lenin's route began in Zurich and continued North through Germany, eventually crossing over into Sweden. In Sweden, he utilized the railway to cross into Russia eventually. Ironically, this last leg of the journey was built for the Allies to aid Russia during the war. However, despite this massive success, the Germans never conducted sabotage operations in France or Britain.²³

In contrast to the other Western Allies, "German sabotage operations achieved their greatest success in the neutral United States."²⁴ The German objective was to prevent the massive U.S. industrial capability in aiding the British war effort.²⁵ In this regard, Nolan was correct in his fears of German sabotage capabilities. However, his worries reflected the U.S. mainland's situation and not necessarily the reality on the ground in France in 1917-1918 for the AEF. Christopher Andrew states, "both the German and British intelligence services thus found it easier to operate in the neutral United States than in war-torn Europe."²⁶ But one can undoubtedly commend Dennis Nolan in his proactive measure in protecting American forces in France. As tens of thousands of American doughboys arrived, they were eventually able to tip the balance in the Allied favor.

In 1918, the Germans eventually capitulated to the Western Allies, which created a unique intelligence opportunity with an influx of German POWs reflected in two documents. The first is the manual given to American forces

on how to conduct detainee operations, including interrogations. The second is a comprehensive summary of interviews and interrogations conducted by the Intelligence section during the War from German POWs. For the reader, imagine a fictional American unit serving on the Western Front in 1918 called A Company. Like many American units on the Western Front, A Company was an infantry company required to man the trenches and await further instructions from their Battalion, Brigade and Division. On an undisclosed date and time, A Company will conduct an attack on the German positions just East of their position. Afterward, A Company performed the attack with a successful outcome. However, the Company Commander now finds himself in possession of numerous German POW's. Luckily, he prepared for this outcome by carefully studying the *Prisoners of War: Regulations and Instructions 1918*.

Following the manual, he tells his men: "Immediately upon capture, prisoners will be disarmed and sent to Brigade Headquarters. There they will be searched, and all concealed weapons removed. They will then be sent with the least possible delay to the division enclosure or collecting point accompanied by a rough report."²⁷ A Company complies with their Commander's orders, and they remove any weapons from the captured Germans. Afterward, a contingent of A Company marches the Germans to the Brigade Headquarters and then onto the Division collection point. Upon arriving at the collection point, the guards search the prisoners. In addition to the guards and other

personnel, intelligence representatives are also present per the manual, which states the following: "All searching will be carried out by the Intelligence and Provost personnel, working in conjunction, the former paying particular attention to papers, documents, etc., and the latter to dangerous weapons and implements. Documents should be made up in parcels according to regiments or battalions and handed over to the Senior Intelligence Officer on the spot."²⁸ Finally, the intelligence officers select several officers and non-commissioned officers for interrogation.

While this was a generalized scenario, similar situations likely occurred all along the Western Front, which allowed the Intelligence section to produce a document such as the *Candid Comment on The American Soldier of 1917-1918 and Kindred Topics by the Germans: Soldiers, Priests, Women, Village Notables, Politicians, and Statesmen*. While this work is extensive in its examination of German POWs, a handful of interrogations stand out. For example, a French interrogation of German prisoners states the following: "It was decided to use picked men against the Americans. A Division of five regiments, to inflict on them a moral defeat. The purpose of the intervention of the 5th Guard Div. and the 28th Inf. Division was to prevent at all costs the achievement of success by the Americans, especially a moral success. The high Command seems to have been much impressed by the Franco-American attacks and to have decided to prevent at all costs the possibility of the United States being able to boast a success over




Image 3. Cover of Candid Comment on The American Solider of 1917 – 1918 and Kindred Topics By The Germans: Soldiers, Priests, Women, Village Notables, Politicians and Statesmen. Photo Credit: US Army

the German troops.”²⁹ While not expressly stated, one can infer that at any costs includes sabotage and other covert operations. One final standout example integration by the 77th Division gives the following summation. “Three Russians, used by the Germans as workmen, escaping to the Americans, stated: We have seen numerous French, Italian, and British prisoners, but no Americans. The Germans fear the Americans more than any other enemy forces on the front.”³⁰ Dennis Nolan’s instincts to protect American forces from the possibility of German sabotage are justified by these examples of the German attitude toward the Americans in France.

Recruitment of the CIP

Now that the AEF formed the Corps of Intelligence Police in 1917, Nolan had to staff his new unit. However, as noted in *America’s Secret Army*, “Adverts in New York and New Orleans papers resulted in the recruitment of a miniature French Foreign Legion. One candidate had a police record. One was mentally unbalanced. One was a French deserter. One was pro-German. One was a Communist who had done time in Blackwell’s Island Penitentiary for Red demonstrations against the property of John D. Rockefeller. Several were just morons.”³¹ Additionally, Nolan had specific recruiting requirements, wanting those “...who have had training in police and speak French fluently.”³² Famously, the head of the Pinkerton agency argued, “there is no such animal.”³³ One must ask the question, why did Dennis Nolan want

to recruit candidates such as these? I argue that police officers and private detectives’ directed recruitment matched the investigatory skills required of counterespionage agents. However, the language requirements and inadequate pay further hampered further recruitment producing some less than stellar candidates, as previously mentioned.

While Dennis Nolan wanted to recruit police officers, not every patrolman is a detective. Likely the CIP would have benefitted from a directed recruitment campaign at the nation’s various detective units and not just the New York Police Department and the New Orleans Police Department. For example, in 1898, the New York Police Department had the following detective capabilities and organization: “The Detective Bureau consisted of 271 detective sergeants (a number fixed by the charter), who operated out of the Central Office at Headquarters. Detective sergeants were patrolmen and roundsmen detailed by the chief of police to perform investigative duties. Although they received the same pay as regular sergeants and could act as supervisors, when necessary, they did not have the same civil service protection and therefore could be demoted for any reason. McCullagh recommended that only one hundred of these investigators remain assigned to Headquarters and the rest be transferred in groups of three to local precincts to investigate crimes as sub-units of his proposed reconfiguration of the Detective Bureau. Detective sergeants, however, in addition to their investigative role, traditionally functioned as important links in the chain

of graft between Police Headquarters and illegal businesses, so the Police Board did not act upon McCullagh's proposal."³⁴ NYPD would later go on to fix these issues, thus ensuring their investigatory capability. However, during the era just before World War I, the NYPD did not have its vast array of detective's modern readers associate with this agency.

Paul S. O'Hara, in his work *Inventing the Pinkertons or Spies, Sleuths, Mercenaries, and Thugs: Being a Story of the Nation's Most Famous (and Infamous) Detective Agency*, Paul S. O'Hara details the origins of this agency. O'Hara is generally pessimistic about the group and its activities throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. However, relevant to the CIP are the skills that the Pinkertons brought to the table. O'Hara is critical of the investigatory capabilities of early 20th century governments, which he argues take over for the Pinkertons. He advises his reader the following: "By the turn of the century, a mushrooming of other detective agencies had cut severely into Pinkertons business of armed guards and strikebreaking. At the same time, new patterns of intervention from the state changed the dynamics of union busting. Beginning with the Pullman strike in 1894 and accelerating through the first decades of the twentieth century, the state was far quicker to deploy police, the state militia, and the federal army early in strikes even before the onset of violence. In Pennsylvania, the Coal and Iron Police remained an important tool in strikebreaking; clashes during a 1902 anthracite strike resulted

in the police killing at least 14 people. Because the Coal and Iron Police still answered to private interests, the state legislature formed the Pennsylvania State Constabulary in 1905. Modeled on the British Constabulary of Ireland, the new force would keep "the turbulent foreign element under control" because "one state policeman should be able to handle 100 foreigners." Although formed as an alternative to the Coal and Iron Police, the State Constabulary served much the same purpose; miners declared them to be "Pennsylvania Cossacks." Not until 1931 would the governor of Pennsylvania abolish the use of the Coal and Iron Police.³⁵ Again relevant to the CIP is the ability of the other police agencies throughout the nation, and not just New York and New Orleans as O'Hara just detailed. There appears no evidence that the CIP or the Army attempted to recruit CIP agents from agencies such as the Pennsylvania State Constabulary (Pennsylvania State Police in modern times).

Additionally, the lack of reasonable compensation likely contributed to the recruitment issue. "The initial group was not promising, but the need for enlisted counterintelligence specialists remained, and the formation of the CIP had set a precedent. The Military Intelligence Section found it increasingly difficult to staff its Headquarters and expand the network of field offices with the existing mix of freshly commissioned reserve officers, civilian volunteers, and hired detectives. Officers were scarce, and competent civilian investigators were hard to find, especially since the War Department paid them

only \$4 a day plus expenses. Thus, it seemed logical for Van Deman's organization to turn to the enlisted ranks of the Army to solve the personnel problems in the counterintelligence arena."³⁶ By contrast, employment in the Pinkertons was extremely lucrative for a private detective if that detective could secure a wealthy client.

With the difficulty in recruitment came a lack of training. The intention of the CIP was to locate qualified applicants already versed in investigation instead of training those who showed aptitude in counterespionage. With millions of men being drafted, it is highly likely that some would have been trainable in counterespionage. Neither Ralph Van Demean nor Dennis Nolan made provisions for a training program that could have aided in the recruitment issues faced by the CIP.

Conclusion

By 1918 the Military Intelligence Division finally recognized the need for counterespionage within its ranks as an expressed duty. "The duties of the Military Intelligence Division consist, in general, in the organization of the intelligence service, positive and negative, including the collection and co-ordination of military information; the supervision of Military Attaches, Department Intelligence Officers, and

Intelligence Officers at posts, stations, camps and with commands in the field, in matters relating to military intelligence; the direction of counterespionage work."³⁷ This is a far cry from 1904 and 1916, when counterespionage was decentralized. Luckily the Commander of the AEF, John Pershing, also recognized the need for solid Intelligence. He states in his final account of the War: "Before our entry into the war, European experience had shown that military operations can be carried out successfully and without unnecessary loss only in the light of complete and reliable information of the enemy."³⁸ However, confusion still remained even in 1919 amongst American forces left behind in Europe. One manual attempted to clarify by advising its readers: "While it may not be possible to lay down definitely any hard and fast rule defining precisely the line of demarcation between the duties of the Military Police and those of the Intelligence Police, it may be stated that the Military Police concerns itself mainly with matters within our own lines, and the Intelligence Police with matters international in character or affecting the enemy."³⁹ Today of the six service branches, only the U.S. Army has its counterespionage capabilities fall under intelligence. The other five have counterintelligence squarely within their law enforcement bureaus.

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