The Historic Miniatures Gaming Society
Pacific Southwest Essay Contest
Tim Keenan Grand Prize Winner

Thutmose III and the Battle of Megiddo: Outsmarting the Enemy[1]

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Abstract

Determining why Thutmose III (*r.* 1482 – 1425 BC) chose to cross the Aruna Road at the Battle of Megiddo in 1481 BC requires conjecture. The *Annals* are silent on many issues. Thutmose's ultimate goal was to regain control of Megiddo from his enemies, but while the Aruna Road was the most direct route to the city, it presented various risks—unlike the Taanach and Zefti roads. Although the Asiatic enemy did not expect Thutmose to take the Aruna Road, they had positioned their northern task force close to its exit (which was near the entrance to Megiddo) to block the entrance to the city. The only way Thutmose could avoid detection by the enemy stationed at the Aruna exit was by detouring into the Kina Valley west of Megiddo. The question nevertheless arises as to why Thutmose would choose the Aruna Road when both Taanach and Zefti appear to have been safer alternatives. A close examination of the translations along with various scholarly evaluations reveals that Thutmose chose the path that presented obvious dangers in order to stage a preemptive, surprise attack on the enemy and win the battle.

Keywords: Aruna, Taanach, Zefti, Via Maris, Asiatic, Megiddo, Yehem, Esdraelon Plain, Kina Valley

Thutmosis III y la batalla de Megiddo: burlando al enemigo

Resumen

Determinar por qué Thutmosis III (r. 1482 - 1425 a. C.) eligió cruzar el camino de Aruna en la batalla de Megiddo en 1481 a. C. requiere conjeturas. Los Anales guardan silencio sobre muchos

temas. El objetivo final de Thutmose era recuperar el control de Megiddo de sus enemigos, pero si bien Aruna Road era la ruta más directa a la ciudad, presentaba varios riesgos, a diferencia de los caminos de Taanach y Zefti. Aunque el enemigo asiático no esperaba que Thutmosis tomara el camino de Aruna, había posicionado su fuerza de tarea del norte cerca de su salida (que estaba cerca de la entrada a Megiddo) para bloquear la entrada a la ciudad. La única forma en que Thutmose podía evitar ser detectado por el enemigo estacionado en la salida de Aruna era desviándose hacia el valle de Kina al oeste de Megiddo. Sin embargo, surge la pregunta de por qué Thutmose elegiría Aruna Road cuando tanto Taanach como Zefti parecen haber sido alternativas más seguras. Un examen minucioso de las traducciones junto con varias evaluaciones académicas revela que Thutmose eligió el camino que presentaba peligros evidentes para organizar un ataque sorpresa preventivo contra el enemigo y ganar la batalla.

Palabras clave: Aruna, Taanach, Zefti, Via Maris, Asiatic, Megiddo, Yehem, Esdraelon Plain, Kina Valley

图特摩斯三世和米吉多战役：智胜敌人

摘要

为确定公元前1481年图特摩斯三世（公元前 1482 - 1425年执政）在米吉多战役中为何选择穿越阿鲁纳路（Aruna Road），推测是必需的。《图特摩斯三世编年史》在许多问题上都没有答案。图特摩斯的最终目标是从敌人手中夺回对米吉多的控制权，不过，尽管阿鲁纳路是通往城市的最直接路线，但与塔阿纳赫（Taanach）和泽夫提（Zefti）路不同的是，它存在不同风险。尽管亚洲敌人没有料到图特摩斯会选择阿鲁纳路，但他们已将北方特遣部队部署在靠近其出口（靠近米吉多入口）的位置，以封锁城市入口。为避免被驻扎在阿鲁纳出口的敌人发现，图特摩斯的唯一方法是绕道进入米吉多以西的吉那溪谷（Kina Valley）。不过，一个问题则是，当塔阿纳赫和泽夫提似乎都是更安全的选择时，为什么图特摩斯还会选择阿鲁纳路？仔细分析翻译以及不同学术评价后发现，图特摩斯选择了一条存在明显危险的道路，以先发制人的方式对敌人发动突袭并赢得战斗。

关键词：阿鲁纳（Aruna），塔阿纳赫（Taanach），泽夫提（Zefti），沿海之路（Via Maris），Asiatic，米吉多（Megiddo），Yehem，埃斯德赖隆平原，吉那溪谷（Kina Valley）

Situated on the Carmel Ridge, a coastal mountain range in northern Israel, the ancient city of Megiddo intersected a trade route—the Via Maris—which ancient merchants used when they traveled throughout the Fertile Crescent (see Image 2).[2] The Via Maris was a very profitable commercial pass for Egypt and control of Megiddo was essential to their economy. However, a rebellious coalition of Egyptian vassal city-states from northern Palestine and Syria, led by the prince of Kadesh and backed by the king of Mitanni, blocked this passage by taking control of Megiddo when they began revolting against Egyptian domination during Egypt's XVIII dynasty (*c.* 1550 BC–1292 BC).[3] Recapturing Megiddo became the ultimate goal of Thutmose III's (*r.* 1482—1425 BC) first campaign, which came to be known as the Battle of Megiddo (1481 BC)—the earliest known recorded chariot battle. The meeting place for this confrontation was the Esdraelon Plain, a large fertile valley in northern Israel, east of Megiddo.

When the annual cycle of the grain crops had ended sometime in the spring of 1481 BC, Thutmose and his army assembled at the Tjaru fortress near the Sinai Peninsula. The *Annals* do not mention the size of his forces although Egyptologist Harold Hayden Nelson maintains that the armies on both sides of the battle did not comprise more than 10,000 to 20,000 men each.[4] Carrying enough provisions for a force of—at minimum—10,000 men, the Egyptian army marched through the Sinai Peninsula and arrived at the loyal city of Gaza ten days later. After resting for a day, they continued marching north to the city of Yehem, where they arrived eleven days later and convened for a meeting.[5] At this juncture, there were three roads they could have taken to cross east to the Esdraelon Plain where the enemy forces were waiting for them: the central pass called the Aruna Road, the north road of Zefti, and the south road to Taanach (see Image 1). Thutmose chose the Aruna Road—the shortest, most direct route to Megiddo.

Determining why he chose the Aruna Road requires conjecture. The *Annals* offer limited information. They only indicate that while the Aruna Road was the most straightforward route to Megiddo, it presented various risks. There were two reasons that made this road a hazardous choice to traverse. First, the *Annals* imply that it was a very narrow path requiring the troops and their horses to walk single file. Second, although the Asiatic coalition did not expect the Egyptian army to choose that path, they had positioned one of their infantry units close to its exit to block the entrance to Megiddo. In spite of the risks, Thutmose decided to take it: "I [swear] as Re loves me, as my father Amon favors me, as my nostrils are renewed with satisfying life, my Majesty proceeds upon this Aruna Road."[6] The only way Thutmose could avoid detection by the enemy stationed at the Aruna exit was by detouring into the Kina Valley in the mountain and forest region west of Megiddo. A close examination of the translations along with various scholarly evaluations reveals that Thutmose chose the path that

presented obvious dangers in order to stage a preemptive, surprise attack on the enemy and win the battle.

It is crucial to note that the study of the Battle of Megiddo is virtually one-sided. Thutmose's *Annals*—recorded on the walls of the temple of Karnak in Thebes—are the only historical source regarding this encounter.[7] Therefore, analysis can be entirely inequitable unless scholars apply caution when interpreting them. No source is one-hundred percent verifiable, particularly when it comes to history this ancient. Most of the accounts of warfare in the late Bronze Age (c. 3300—1200 BC)[8] come from illustrations and inscriptions of the XVIII and XIX Egyptian Dynasties, which tended to exaggerate the numbers of dead enemy and captured booty to exalt the military skill of the ruling pharaoh—whether it was real or not.[9] The Temple of Rameses III at Medinet Habu reveal many one-sided exaltation passages such as this:

> By Amon-Re-Harakhte "[Words spoken by] Amon-Re-Harakhte: 'Welcome in Peace! [You have] captured [him who attacked you] and you have slain him who violated your frontier, my strength being with you [to cast down] the lands [for] you. You have cut off the heads of [the Asiatics I have given you] millions of jubilees and hundreds of thousands [of years forever upon the throne of] Horus.'"[10]

Researchers should never analyze the available sources individually. Scholars need to examine and debate them in conjunction with other findings from the ancient world, without forcing an interpretation for which there is no proof. Historian William J. Hamblin understands this well when he says "[a] coherent picture must be cobbled together from scattered bits of information . . ."[11] Furthermore, there was only so much data scribes were able to carve on a finite amount of wall space; it often influenced what to include and what to leave out. This made the news they proposed necessarily limited and potentially misleading. Thutmose's *Annals* regarding the Battle of Megiddo provide a perfect example of this. His chief royal scribe, who was also a temple priest, took more pains in listing the spoils of war than in recording the strategic maneuvers of the battle itself, although it was no doubt Thutmose who had commanded him to do so. Historian James Henry Breasted postulates that this was likely because the booty went to the temples as an offering to the god Amon. In fact, Thutmose understood that it was Amon who had made his victory at Megiddo possible.[12] The *Annals* state, "My Majesty proceeded northward, bearing his father Amon-Re, Lord of Thebes, [who opened the way] before me."[13]

Scholars must also use caution regarding the various philological issues concerning the translation of a language that has been essentially dead for millennia. Moreover, the many gaps due to the deterioration of the carved surfaces make translating these texts that much more difficult. The academic community has widely relied on Nel-



Image 1: Map of available roads to the Esdraelon Plain as well as the Kina Brook. Licensing: this media file is in the public domain.

son's translation of Thutmose's *Annals*, but Egyptologist and philologist R. O. Faulkner has dedicated a study on comparing and contrasting some of his own translations with Nelson's on various points.[14] This study will weigh both versions when examining certain passages for interpretation.

A brief, historical background of the events leading up to the Battle of Megiddo will be helpful to better understand the nature of Thutmose's response to the Asiatic aggression. The Hyksos invasion and settlement of the Nile Delta around 1650 BC deprived the Egyptians of the rich resources they controlled along the third Cataract of the Nile in Lower Egypt.[15] The threat to Egypt became too close for comfort. One-hundred eight years later, Pharaoh Ahmose (*c.* 1550—1525 BC) of the XVIII Dynasty successfully expelled the Hyksos. However, these west Asian peoples had represented only a portion of the problems that Egypt was beginning to face. Further north, the Asiatic coalition of Egyptian vassal states had begun to rebel against Egyptian domination,



Image 2: Map illustrating the Fertile Crescent. The Via Maris runs from Egypt northward along the coastline of the Mediterranean Sea, throughout Phoenicia, Assyria, and Mesopotamia. Megiddo is located in the thin strip between Egypt and Phoenicia. Licensed under the Creative Commons.

but they had not been an immediate or crucial concern until Thutmose came to power in 1482 BC. Thutmose's predecessors had limited their campaigns mostly to adopting a defensive stance for the protection of Egypt. His aunt and immediate predecessor, Hatshepsut (*r.* 1504—1482 BC), was not militarily active throughout her reign. This surely stirred the northern dissenters to rebellion. There is some speculation that Hatshepsut's architect, Senenmut, had a hand in ensuring that Thutmose eventually assumed full authority.[16] Perhaps Hatshepsut's lack of military endeavors is what threatened Egyptian hegemony and made a change in leadership imperative. The *Annals* state that by the time Thutmose came to power, "all the chiefs of [all] the countries [which were] subject to Egypt" met at Megiddo to stand against the pharaoh.[17] Thutmose understood that he needed to create a stronger Egyptian military. To that end, he proposed innovative tactical changes by shifting the Egyptian military standard from defense to offense.[18]

Despite the threat, establishing total security of Egypt was only half the motivation. While Egyptian control of Megiddo meant reestablishing dominion over the Via Maris, Thutmose's victory also helped pave the way for Egypt to eventually gain hegemony over the entire Levant (see Image 4). A military restructuring program had begun under Hatshepsut, but Thutmose perfected it through his strategic military genius.[19] However, he did experience certain setbacks, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the battle. [20] His troops gave in to looting and pillaging, allowing the enemy to escape within the walls of Megiddo and putting Thutmose in a position to lay siege to the city for months to reclaim it.

Thutmose's army was undergoing a period of transformation and, as historian Donald B. Redford explains, a professional army would develop "throughout his reign."[21] The key words are *throughout his reign*, which suggest that for Thutmose's first campaign his army was likely not quite the professional soldiery of his later campaigns. Indeed, at the Battle of Megiddo, most of his infantry were locally recruited militia. Their anxiety regarding taking the Aruna Road may be indicative of their inexperience; it required a great deal of persuasion and encouragement from Thutmose.

There is no record in the *Annals* indicating when Thutmose spoke to his men about which of the three roads they would take to meet their enemy at the Esdraelon Plain, but he must have previously disclosed to them that he planned on taking the Aruna Road since at the council at Yehem, he asked them, "Tell ye me [that which is in your hearts]."[22] Scholars have translated the troops' response of trepidation in various ways. Some say that Thutmose's men feared that the Aruna road was too *narrow,* suggesting that the entire length of the road was too confining for an army to cross; other translations say it *became narrower,* suggesting that the Aruna tapered along the way and did not offer enough space at the end of the road to organize for battle. Either way, Thutmose's men feared that taking the Aruna Road would require them to walk single file. In the *Annals* they responded, "Will not horse go behind [horse, the troops] and the people like wise?"[23]

The rebel army had already divided most of their forces between Aruna and Taanach by the time Thutmose and his men began to cross over. The larger of the enemy's two units was stationed at Taanach. There is no evidence in the *Annals* that they even considered the Zefti road further north.[24] The rebel forces must have been familiar with the precarious topography of the Aruna Road and did not expect Thutmose to take it. Since their larger unit was at Taanach, they were clearly convinced that the Egyptians would take the southern route. This made sense because Taanach was the first path at the end of Thutmose's long, northward trek from Egypt. Because of this, the rebel forces were not vigilant of what was going on north of their defensive positions. All of their attention was to the south.



Image 3: Thutmose III statue in Luxor Museum. Licensing: this media file is in the public domain.

Since Thutmose knew that the enemy would not expect him to take the Aruna Road, he encouraged his fearful troops, telling them: "Do not let them think among these enemies whom Re detests, 'Does his Majesty proceed upon another road (because) he is beginning to fear us?' (So) they will think."[25] However, according to Thutmose's reconnaissance units the rebel's northern task force had hitherto positioned themselves "at the southern corner of the valley of the Kina" between the Aruna exit and the entrance to Megiddo.[26] This explains why Thutmose's men stated, "[i]t is reported saying 'The enemy are there, ready upon the outside and they are becoming numerous.'"[27] Had Thutmose attempted to organize an army of 10,000+ men at the Aruna exit, the enemy's task force could have easily ambushed them before they had time to prepare for battle. In other words, the Aruna exit led to a potential death trap for Thutmose and his men. This, then, begs the question, *why take it?*

Understanding the risk, Thutmose reassured his men by saying, "I will not permit [my victorious army] to set out in advance of my majesty,"[28] but to avoid an ambush, he decided they would detour into the Kina Valley, via the Mismus pass, before reaching the Aruna exit. Hills and forests buffered the one-mile distance between the Kina Valley and the Aruna exit, thus shielding Thutmose's position from the enemy.[29]

The first lunar date as recorded in Thutmose's *Annals*, "[y]ear 23, first month of the third season, day 21," coincides with the day the battle took place.[30] While it is difficult to link this date to our modern dating system, it putatively corresponds to roughly May 20, 1481 BC. The night before the battle, the Egyptian army arrived at the Kina Valley where they settled for a night's rest on the banks of the Kina brook just one mile from the Megiddo Plateau. The plateau was located north of the Esdraelon Plain behind the enemy's defensive positions. Early the next morning, Thutmose and his men advanced toward an opening which led to the plateau, but Thutmose's generals urged him to wait for the entire army to catch up before debouching in case they met resistance.[31] Once they were all gathered, they emerged from the pass seem-

ingly without the rebel army detecting their movements. They established camp one mile from the city of Megiddo, but by the time they had all reached their intended position, they only had a few hours of daylight left. Thutmose used that time to spread out in battle formation in preparation for the next day. His battle line extended from south of the Kina brook to a point northwest of Megiddo, the Pharaoh with his chariot units in the center.[32] When the enemy's northern task force noticed the Egyptian units on the plateau, they dispatched messengers to redeploy their southern unit at Taanach.

For Thutmose, choosing the Aruna Road meant that he could launch a preemptive, surprise attack on his enemy. His position, achieved by his ability to move about under cover, forced the enemy to reorganize when the Egyptian army was already in battle formation; a serious setback to the enemy's original tactical plans. Thutmose knew the Asiatic army was light on infantry. Whether or not his reconnaissance team actually observed this, the Egyptians were very familiar with the military organization of the Canaanite army and would have already known that they were more chariot heavy.[33]

While the *Annals* mention the presence of an infantry in Thutmose's army, they do not record it actually battling the enemy.[34] Details of the battle, in fact, are woefully lacking. The *Annals* only record that when the enemy, "saw that his Majesty prevailed against them, they fled headlong [to] Megiddo with faces of fear. They abandoned their horses, and their chariots of gold and silver."[35] Although it is dubious that the Asiatic charioteers fled without a fight—as the quote seems to suggest—it is important to reiterate that they were light on infantry. Historian Robert Drews submits that many of the enemy infantry probably served as defensive bowmen on top of Megiddo's walls.[36] From there, they could discharge a barrage of arrows to confuse the Egyptian army, thus paving the way for the rebel charioteers to move in for fierce combat.

However, a question arises regarding Drews' assumption: how could these men not have noticed, from their elevated vantage point, the Egyptian army emerging onto the Megiddo Plateau? Faulkner suggests that according to the *Annals* Thutmose *did* encounter a small body of the enemy at the mouth of the pass, but after a brief scuffle they

Image 4: In antiquity, the Levant comprised modern-day Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Turkey, Greece, and Libya. Licensed under the Creative Commons.

fell.[37] This notion stems from a fragmented passage in the *Annals*, which Faulkner translates, "His Majesty called out upon [this road (?)] . . . they fell, while yon [wretched] foe . . . [Praise (?)] ye [him and extol the might of (?)]."[38] The key words are: "they fell." However, scholars must view this interpretation with caution because of the patchy nature of the text. In a subsequent passage, the *Annals*—as translated by Nelson—suggest that Thutmose emerged onto the plateau without opposition. "Behold his majesty goes forth together with his victorious troops and they fill the valley."[39] Another potential scenario could be that the enemy *did* see the Egyptians debouch onto the plateau, but did not interrupt their passage to give themselves more time to redeploy their southern task unit stationed at Taanach. This would have given them more time to regroup and set up a new tactical plan.

Lacking the information to understand what happened at this juncture, estimations become necessary as long as they are based on information scholarship already knows. The Egyptians had created a highly maneuverable, light-weight, and stable chariot, designed to reach high speeds on flat terrain. They did so by moving the axle to the back of the carrying platform. This ensured a steadier base from which to fire their weapons. While Egypt proper did not offer such level terrain (as opposed to the more varied landscapes of Canaan and Syria),[40] one can postulate that the Egyptians improved their chariots to function well in the more available level land of the Near East—especially since they were keenly aware of the threat that these Asiatic societies were beginning to pose. Contrarily, the Canaanite and Mitanni created a chariot that would be adept on all grounds (flat, hilly, etc.) The problem was that their construction to that end rendered them so heavy that they performed less effectively overall. It is ironic then that the Canaanites would use the chariot unit as their principle strategic weapon in warfare.[41]

Infantries on both sides of the battle comprised axmen, archer, sword, and spear units, but at Megiddo the Egyptians possessed an advantage of these foot soldiers. When in battle formation, the Egyptian charioteers typically fired at a distance acting as a shield until the foot soldiers took their positions. Infantry units are vital because there is only so much chariots can do on uneven terrain. While the Esdraelon plain was the most level fighting land in the area, slopes did exist rendering the chariot forces on both sides less effective than foot soldiers—hence the importance of a sizeable infantry, which Thutmose had.

In preparation for the battle, Thutmose divided his infantry into three units, two of which flanked the pharaoh and his chariot force on both sides. According to historian Brian Todd Carey, he retained a third reserve unit behind the steep banks of the Kina Brook. Thutmose and his center chariot force then likely charged and pierced a gap in the enemy line while the infantry unit to his right pushed the enemy back against their camp.[42] The Asiatic

Image 5: Relief in the Karnak Temple showing Thutmosis III slaying Canaanite captives. Battle of Megiddo, 15th Century BC. Licensed under the Creative Commons.

army's lack of infantry left their charioteers vulnerable. When pressed by the Egyptian infantry, they had no choice but to flee to the safety of the city.[43] Any rebel infantry on top of Megiddo's ramparts likely ended up using their arrows to protect their charioteers as they fled the battleground to climb the city walls.

It is understandable, then, that Thutmose would be so angered when his troops lost their sense of priority and gave in to looting. Aside from taking living captives, Thutmose's men had seized nearly 1,000 chariots of gold and silver, over 2,000 horses, nearly 2,000 cattle, and a large quantity of weapons as well as 200 suits of bronze armor.[44] Reveling in what they naturally felt was an Egyptian victory forced Thutmose to redirect their priorities. He commanded his army saying "[c]apture ye victory. Behold, [every land] is given [to my Majesty according to the command] of Re this day; for every chief of every [north]ern country which has revolted is within it; for it is the capture of a thousand cities, the capture of Megiddo. Capture ye, capture ye, thoroughly!"[45]

It is necessary to make assumptions (as long as they are reasonable) since the *Annals* are virtually silent regarding the battle itself. Spalinger suggests that Thutmose's tactical ability to "catch the enemy" was "not a strategic event."[46] But this assessment seems to be a little too radical. While it is true that

the Pharaoh's army had not yet fully developed into the professional soldiery it would eventually become, Thutmose used his genius in other strategic ways to make up for his army's limitations. He was no doubt keenly aware that he faced a more experienced army and likely deemed that a preemptive, surprise attack on the enemy was necessary if he were going to avoid heavy casualty and win the war. Had Thutmose taken the Taanach Road, his infantry would have met the enemy forces head on. The Taanach Road was also much further away from Thutmose's ultimate goal—the city of Megiddo. He and his men would have had to fight the enemy for about four miles up the road to Megiddo. Thutmose understood that choosing the Aruna Road, though risky, would make victory much more strategically feasible.

An analysis of the evidence, thus, suggests that Thutmose did not win so much on account of his troops' military skills; their actions, in fact, put their leader in a position to lay siege to the city of Megiddo for months rather than storming it in triumphant victory. Thutmose won because of his remarkable strategic maneuvers. He knew that his army was not as proficient as that of the Asiatics, so he deftly outsmarted his enemy by crossing into the Kina Valley and staging a surprise attack behind the enemy's line of defense.

Since the foolish actions of Thutmose's soldiers forced him to storm the city of Megiddo, it might seem as if the Pharaoh's ability to lead was tenuous. However, a brilliant leader must precede his troops and willingly be the first to die. These are the qualities that cause men to follow their commander and they are the qualities of the model Egyptian warrior-king. To that end, the *Annals* state that Thutmose "set out in advance of his troops himself."[47] Providing this is not pure propaganda; this statement alone should override any criticism over his failure to prevent his troops from looting and temporarily letting the enemy get away. Things may have simply gotten out of hand in the immediate aftermath of the battle. The fact is, Thutmose won the war against the Asiatics and ultimately regained control of Megiddo. In true, age-old Egyptian tradition, he did not seek glory for himself alone. The hieroglyphs chronicle, above all else, his victory for the security of his country and the Egyptian people. He was willing to put his life on the line, and won the battle in a strategically, brilliant way.

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Notes

1 All dates of the XVIII Egyptian Dynasty are subject to dispute in the historical and archaeological communities and therefore vary widely. To avoid confusion, this article will rely on historian Richard A. Gabriel's dates as stated in his book, *Thutmose III: The Military Biography of Egypt's Greatest Warrior King*. Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2009.

2 Claude Mariottini, 2019. "Megiddo." *Newstex Weblog post.* November 25.

3 Eric Cline, *The Battles of Armageddon: Megiddo and the Jezreel Valley from the Bronze Age to the Nuclear Age* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 7; Kadesh was a Canaanite city-state located on the River Orontes between Lebanon and Syria. Mitanni was located in northern Syria and southeast Anatolia.

4 Harold Hayden Nelson, *The Battle of Megiddo* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1913), 6.

5 Spalinger, *War in Ancient Egypt,* 85; Cline, *The Battles of Armageddon*, 18.

6 *The Annals* line 40/Nelson, 22.

7 James B. Pritchard, ed., *The Ancient Near East, Volume I: An Anthology of Texts and Pictures* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 175.

8 The Bronze Age in Africa and the Near East began much earlier than in other parts of the world; it covered the period between 3300 and 1200 BC.

9 P.R.S. Moorey, "The Emergence of the Light, Horse-Drawn Chariot in the Near-East c. 2000-1500 B.C.," *World Archaeology* 18, 2 (1986): 208.

10 *Medinet Habu–Volume VIII: The Eastern High Gate,* plate 599; trans. by The Epigraphic Survey (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), 29.

11 William J. Hamblin, *Warfare in the Ancient Near East to 1600 BC* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 204.

12 James Henry Breasted, trans. and ed., *Ancient Records of Egypt, Volume 2: The Eighteenth Dynasty* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1906. Reprint, 2001), 166.

13 *The Annals* line 57-59/Nelson, 29.

14 R. O. Faulkner, "The Battle of Megiddo," *The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* 28 (1942): 2.

15 The term Hyksos refers to rulers of foreign lands. The Fifteenth Dynasty was a foreign dynasty founded by Salitis, a Hyksos from West Asia.

16 Charles Freeman, *Egypt, Greece, and Rome: Civilizations of the Ancient Mediterranean*. 3rd Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 65.

17 *The Annals* line 22.

18 Richard A. Gabriel, *Thutmose III: The Military Biography of Egypt's Greatest Warrior King* (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2009), 55.

19 Ibid.

20 Deborah O'Daniel Cantrell, *The Horsemen of Israel: Horses and Chariotry in Monarchic Israel* (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2011), 114.

21 Donald B. Redford, *The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 197.

22 *The Annals* line 25/Nelson, 21.

23 Ibid., line 29/Nelson, 21.

24 Gabriel, *Thutmose III*, 96.

25 *The Annals* lines 45-47/Nelson, 22.

26 Nelson, *The Battle of Megiddo*, 30.

27 *The Annals* lines 28-29/Nelson, 21.

28 *Ibid.,* line 53/Nelson, 29.

29 Gabriel, *Thutmose III*, 96, 104.

30 *The Annals* line 85/Nelson, 44.

31 Brian Todd Carey, *Warfare in the Ancient World* (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Penn & Sword Military, 2005), 16.

32 Robert Drews, *The End of the Bronze Age: Changes in Warfare and he Catastrophe CA. 1200 BC* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 129.

33 Gabriel, *Thutmose III*, 68, 74, 97, 104-107.

34 Drews, *The End of the Bronze Age*, 136.

35 *The Annals* lines 86-86/Nelson, 44.

36 Ibid., 130.

37 Faulkner, "The Battle of Megiddo, 9.

38 Ibid., 3.

39 *The Annals* lines 75-76/Nelson, 30.

40 Gabriel, *Thutmose III*, 54.

41 Ibid., 78.

42 Carey, *Warfare in the Ancient World,* 16-17.

43 Gabriel, *Thutmose III*, 64, 108.

44 Richard A. Gabriel, 2007, "What We Learned . . . from the Battle of Megiddo," *Military History,* November 27.

45 *The Annals* line 90/Nelson, 45.

46 Spalinger, *War in Ancient Egypt,* 85, 86.

47 *The Annals* line 54/Nelson, 29.