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## German Unification through the Blueprint of Prussian Greatness: A Study of Similarities between the Prussians, Frederick the Great, and Otto von Bismarck

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Any modern day discussion concerning the Father of Germany automatically invokes the name of Otto von Bismarck and, by virtue of his accomplishments, any list of other accomplished German leaders would also include Frederick II, or Frederick the Great. Ironically, because both men were actually Prussian, they both sought (at least initially in the case of Bismarck) the expansion of Prussia, not necessarily the creation of a unified German nation.<sup>1</sup> Despite a full century separating the two men, they both came to power in Prussia, inheriting a nation of unique challenges, both domestically and internationally. Both men maneuvered through those challenges and displayed leadership, diplomacy, incredible drive, and an absolute devotion to their state. There was, of course, the lure of personal honor and accomplishment.

These unique challenges did lend to differences in some of their actions and the paths chosen, but there remain eerie similarities. Like Frederick, Bismarck considered Austrian influence across the German states to be a threat to Prussia's emergence as a legitimate power in Europe. Both men initiated a series of conflicts with Austria, equating to three wars across seven years that eventually involved and claimed victory over both Austria and France. In the end, an emerging nationalism served both Prussians in their vision for a greater Prussia and a Prussian-led German Confederation; for Bismarck and his role, this led directly to a unified Germany. In Europe, this represented something different and separated Germany from other states. It promoted greater influence and the arrival of a German state in its own right.

Whether planned or completely subconsciously, Bismarck used Frederick the Great's successful expansion of Prussia as a foundation for his own actions. At times, Bismarck specifically invoked the name of Frederick in a speech or while addressing parliament—arguably not just for the impact of his namesake, but to specifically link his actions or ideals to those of his predecessor.<sup>2</sup> This, of itself, does

not connect the dots of similarities, but suggests in some part that Bismarck used Frederick's actions as a blueprint, building a foundation on what he felt worked, and altering those paths he felt offered better choices.

There is countless literature and historiography discussing Prussia, its rise, diplomacy, its military precision, its fall to Napoleon; conversely, there is just as much, if not more, existing research on the same facets of Germany, even specifically its unification and arrival in Europe as a major power. However, one element consistently absent is the bridge between these two great Prussians who sought greatness for themselves, but also, and very importantly, for Prussia itself. A quick sampling of cited works reflects titles such as, *Nineteenth-Century Germany: Politics, Culture, and Society 1780-1918*, *Bismarck and Germany: 1862-1890*, *German History, 1770-1866*, and *The Rise of Brandenburg-Prussia to 1786*—all distinctly covering Frederick the Great's era or Bismarck's role as the "Iron Willed."<sup>3</sup>

Admittedly, sources and research exist that cover the span of both periods, but these exist primarily as less analytical works, leaving no room for real comparison of the two key Prussians, and the similarities between their concepts and actions. John Lord's work from 1894, *Two German Giants: Frederic the Great and Bismarck –The Founder and The Builder of German Empire*, implies an analysis specifically discussing more than a superficial link between Frederick and Bismarck existed. However, it too tackled the subjects almost purely as two completely separate discussions with too brief an introduction of any given parallels.<sup>4</sup>

Perhaps Bismarck's path to greatness was not entirely by coincidence. That he followed something akin to Frederick's own path was somewhat inevitable considering the nature of both the German states and Prussia's similar problems in both eras. Ultimately, Frederick the Great and Otto von Bismarck embraced a militaristic approach to statesmanship and used Prussia's famous infantry as the tool for foreign policy. Both men viewed Austria as the biggest threat to Prussia's rise to power; they understood and used France and Russia as pawns in diplomatic matters. After fighting three wars, they both embraced the importance of consolidating their gains. Following their wars, they served as brokers of peace and both turned to domestic policies that ensured the state was on the correct path to greatness.

Even before gaining power, they both envisioned a stronger Prussia, one that Europe would have no choice but to concede was now a major power. For both Frederick and Bismarck, this rise to glory aimed specifically at creating a greater

Prussia. It is important to understand this was a greater Prussia serving as the overseer of the smaller German states, not the annexation or creation of a unified German nation.<sup>5</sup> The well-being of the State was foremost in their minds. The Prussian military was the key to this success, especially since both men perceived Austria as both a threat and, quite simply, “in the way” of a Prussian-led and German-dominated Central Europe. With the accession of Maria Theresa to the Austrian throne in 1740, Frederick saw an opportunity to test the 75,000-man army he had inherited and begin his “role of defender of German liberties against Hapsburg despotism.”<sup>6</sup>

### **Pursuit of Diplomatic Gains and Legitimacy**

When Frederick took control of Prussia from his father, he inherited an army that was the envy of Europe—envied for its machine-like precision and execution of drills—but it was also relatively untested, as his father refused to use it in pitched battles because of the cost of achieving its precision. Frederick believed this as another reason that most of Europe viewed Prussia as a minor player, at best, and vowed that he would not play lapdog to the European powers.<sup>7</sup> In his opinion, the key to power and recognition was through acquisitions. Despite objections from his ministers and military advisor, he felt he had the army to survive a war with Austria.<sup>8</sup>

With an ideology that his army would serve as the best tool for state building and originally as the primary tool for his foreign policy, Frederick invaded Silesia expecting to completely pry it from Austria.<sup>9</sup> Within seven months of his accession to power, he threw Prussia into what became seven years of military conflict across three brutal wars. Frederick emerged victorious and created the powerful Prussia he intended to produce.<sup>10</sup> His three consecutive Silesian Wars, actually occurring sporadically on-again/off-again from July 1742 to February 1763, saw the Prussians defeat half of the European powers. Frederick routed the Saxons, Austrians, French, and lesser German states. By the end of his reign, thirty-one years later, Frederick had increased his army to 200,000 men.<sup>11</sup> Gaining all of Silesia also served as the catalyst for German nationalism, an event that lifted the shame from losing the Thirty Years’ War. These decisive victories over the Austrians and the French set the stage for a Europe that now recognized Prussia as a legitimate power.<sup>12</sup>

The Treaty of Dresden in 1745 ended the Second Silesian War and it was obvious to the public and politicians that Frederick II expanded Prussian influence in Europe. Prussia was now a major European power. The treaty ended greatly in Prussia's favor. For instance, it secured the territorial gains the Prussian military won. With this in hand, Frederick II secured the moniker "the Great" and Frederick the Great found its way into the public lexicon.<sup>13</sup>

The rise of Otto von Bismarck as a Prussian man of power is beyond the scope of this essay. King Wilhelm I, having inherited the crown in 1861, observed the Prussian Army was no longer the elite force that brought Prussia to power.



Figure 1 *The Allegiance of the Silesian Diet before Frederick II in Breslau*. Oil on canvas by Adolph von Menzel, c. 1855.

Consequently, he acknowledged that the lack of military might omitted a key tool of aggressive foreign policy. During a political standoff with Parliament over military reforms that would double the size of the regular army, increase reserve forces, extend conscription and service obligation rates, add additional infantry and cavalry regiments, and ultimately increase military expenditures, Wilhelm appointed Bismarck as the Minister-President in September 1862. Both men knew the importance of ensuring this military reform. It would promote Prussian influence. Bismarck immediately went on the offensive, at least politically.<sup>14</sup>

James J. Sheehan quotes Leopold von Ranke's 1836 *Politisches Gespräch* as the underpinning of what became a unique spin on Prussian (and German) politics: "A state owes its position in the world to the degree of its independence, the maintenance of which requires the subordination of all domestic considerations."<sup>15</sup> It is interesting that, like Frederick the Great, Bismarck set out initially only to create a name for Prussia through foreign policy—perhaps again,

subconsciously walking in Frederick's path towards a greater Prussia, and not with any expectations of a unified German nation. Both men executed daring statesmanship that often tight-roped above the possibility of massed enemies they could not hope to defeat alongside the quest for an unquestionable military might. Once realizing success abroad, they both turned full attention inwards to a more peaceful outlook on the European scene and began reforms within their own borders.<sup>16</sup>

During the aforementioned standoff with Parliament, Bismarck made his now infamous speech that challenged the government's lack of action. His speech suggested that if a decision was not possible, then it was his duty, as Minister-President to breach the "hiatus" in government for the good of the state.<sup>17</sup> Bismarck showed concern over Austrian influence in Germany, and although initially concerned only with creating a stronger, more influential Prussia, he showed the first hint of his intent to use rising German nationalism as a tool of policy. Bismarck's speech outlined both a domestic policy decision to undercut the existing constitution and begin a foreign policy of Prussian dominance over the German question:

Certainly the great independence of the individual makes it difficult in Prussia to rule with the constitution. . . . A constitutional crisis is not shameful, but honorable. Furthermore we are perhaps too 'educated' to put up with a constitution; we are too critical; . . . there are in the country too many subversive elements who have an interest in revolutionary change. This may sound paradoxical, but it goes to show how difficult it is in Prussia to carry on a constitutional existence. . . . Germany doesn't look to Prussia's liberalism, but to its power: Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Baden can indulge in liberalism, but no one will expect them to undertake Prussia's role; Prussia must gather and consolidate her strength in readiness for the favorable moment, which has already been missed several times; Prussia's boundaries according to the Vienna treaties are not favorable to a healthy political life; not by means of speeches and majority verdicts will the great decisions of the time be made—but by iron and blood.<sup>18</sup>

Following this speech, Bismarck embarked on a series of policies and practices that undercut parliamentary practice, and although it isolated him as a maverick that few trusted, it solidified his worth to Wilhelm I. By 1863, he established himself as all but the dictator of Prussia—with full support of the king.<sup>19</sup>

Although Bismarck also viewed the real struggle over Germany as a question of Prussia versus Austria,<sup>20</sup> his “war” with Austria did not begin as an outright invasion as did Frederick’s. For Frederick, the opportunity arose with the death of the last male heir apparent in Austria. For Bismarck, it was the death of the ruling family without an obvious heir to Schleswig-Holstein. Although his real interest in these two German states bordering and under the influence of Denmark was minimal, his real motive was flexing Prussian influence via the new German nationalism card while undermining Austrian influence. However, he did secretly covet the annexation of the duchies into a greater Prussia.<sup>21</sup> These annexations were the first step in a new foreign policy to vigorously exploit any Austrian weakness and assert a leadership role over the German states.<sup>22</sup>

With Austria all but sidelined in the Schleswig-Holstein dealings, Bismarck then showed his political skills. He initially worked with Austria to defeat the Danish military, and then after negating the threat from either the Danish or the Austrians, he reneged on the deal he had earlier brokered with Austria allowing administrative control of Holstein. This successful annexing of both duchies proved his diplomatic approach of “patience, flexibility, and the ability to exploit his opponent’s hopes, fears, and illusions.” With his leadership and iron will, he also gained additional favor domestically. Liberals started embracing the rise in patriotic fervor and German nationalism that came from military victory. Consequently, it was here that the roots of a possible unified German nation began taking hold.<sup>24</sup>

Through his very deliberate actions of cutting Austria out of Schleswig-Holstein affairs and the addition of Italy as an anti-Austria ally, Bismarck began the war with Austria that he had sought ever since 1858. Bismarck offered the German states, those of the Confederation, his plan for creating a national parliament that would work for creating a new political entity—a United States of Germany, so to speak—but it was received as more of a ruse simply to irritate and isolate Austria. Skeptic or not, there was still ongoing debate within the Confederation whether to accept this proposal when Austria and Italy began mobilizing troops along their borders. Bismarck then extended the invitation for the Confederation to join the fight against the Hapsburgs. The invitation was declined, and actually drove the majority of the Confederation states to mobilize for war on the side of Austria.<sup>25</sup>

In June 1866, King Wilhelm made a speech “to the German People” that

blamed the Confederation for keeping Germany fragmented. As such, Prussia dissolved the Confederation of States, declaring it no longer a voice for the German people. Prussia then marched to resolve the matter on the field of battle.<sup>26</sup> Like Frederick the Great's Silesian Wars, Bismarck led Prussia into a war with Austria involving multiple German states. He too noticed the gateway into Austria proper was through Saxony, and his invasion of Saxony began the Austro-Prussian War. With Prussia assuming center stage, the conflict spread across Europe and added France as a military foe. Just as Frederick led Prussia in the Seven Years' War, Bismarck moved against France in the Franco-Prussian War.

Both men oversaw the Prussian military engagements for seven years in three pitched wars. Frederick the Great led Prussia through the Silesian War, a portion of the Seven Years' War, and the War of Bavarian Succession, while Bismarck led Prussia through the Second Schleswig War, the Austro-Prussian War, and the Franco-Prussian War. These latter three wars redefined Prussia as a major power, increased German nationalism, and created a "new Europe." A new Europe emerging from sustained wars and battle scars that then required years of substantial peace, principally in regards to Prussia, to realize new gains and establish the new shift in power.<sup>27</sup>

The Franco-Prussian War is vital to understanding the Prussian blueprint that allowed for changes and what those changes actually meant for Prussia and, essentially, Germany. First, Bismarck, like Frederick before him, kept his wars for power short, concise, and decisive. The reason for only seven total years of war for both men is because not only did Prussia not have the natural resources or manpower to sustain a long conflict, they were both aware of the danger long wars posed. Both men were constantly weary of Prussia's precarious position, surrounded by other great powers. Neither could afford for those powers to take advantage of a war-embittered Prussia.<sup>28</sup>

With this in mind, Bismarck planned for a deliberate, but quick war that specifically challenged Austria. When the Austro-Prussian War finally ended, it saw the complete dissolution of the German Confederation, replacing it with the Prussian-dominated North German Confederation. Simultaneously, a southern confederation existed, but Prussia heavily influenced its autonomy and diplomacy. Also of note, the treaty ended war with Austria and allowed it to remain intact and free of occupation. Ultimately, Prussia's victory in 1867 allowed Bismarck to finally exclude Austria from Germany.



Further, Bismarck painstakingly managed to convince the crown that Saxony should retain its territorial integrity<sup>29</sup>—a lesson perhaps learned from Frederick’s treatment of defeated German states. The goal was a greater Prussia, and a unified German Confederation free of Austrian influence, not the complete destruction of Austria or of any German entity. It was clear that Bismarck sought the integration of Saxony into the Prussian fold, noting it was better for both parties to treat Saxony as a defeated enemy state rather than a conquered province. He genuinely hoped this would lift the isolation or hesitation from Saxony considering any German unification discussions.<sup>30</sup>

Just as the Austro-Prussian War ended, France, under Napoleon III, began jockeying for power in both Western and Central Europe. He demanded compensation for Prussia’s gains and for staying out of the conflict. On this point, Bismarck was adamant that no German territory, or any land inhabited by German-speaking peoples was negotiable, and flat-out refused France’s demands.<sup>31</sup> Essentially, Napoleon “throwing his hat in the ring” at this point only served to infuriate Bismarck, who now viewed France as a threat to undermine the prospect of a unified Germany. Immediately after hostilities with Austria concluded, still in 1866, Bismarck referred to France as the state with “a revolver in his pocket, his finger on the trigger,” and as Erich Eyck summarizes, “[f]rom then onwards, he spoke of the *inevitable* war against France.”<sup>32</sup>

Following the Prussian achievements of 1866, specifically providing for the unification of Northern Germany, and despite Prussian annexation of some duchies, the majority of Germans considered this current state of affairs as a necessary and meaningful step forward.<sup>33</sup> With public support, Bismarck, learning from Frederick’s own use of nationalist and patriotic fervor as a tool of foreign policy, championed the cause of Germany and Germans. For Bismarck, this was his first step away from solely serving the Prussian state and glancing to his own greatness as the father of a unified German nation.<sup>34</sup> With this new vision, Bismarck convinced himself, Prussia, and the Northern Confederation, that the path to a truly unified Germany lay with war against France, and the subjugation of Bavaria and Württemberg in the process.<sup>35</sup>

Consistent with his diplomatic panache, Bismarck created a crisis provoking France’s declaration of war on Prussia. Using France as the aggressor, Bismarck allowed France to agitate the German people. They believed, once again, they were under attack from France and the Napoleon namesake. This political



maneuver promoted further German nationalism and rallied all the German states in a unified effort to defend German honor against an ever-aggressive France.<sup>36</sup>

The Franco-Prussian War started July 1870 and ended with a preliminary peace signed seven months later in February 1871. With such a quick rout of the French, Bismarck had the necessary momentum to serve-up what he was brewing in the undercurrent of domestic and foreign politics for at least a decade. He forced the surrender of the territory of Alsace and Lorraine from France to Germany.

With Alsace and Lorraine secured, Bismarck saw the creation of the German Empire. King Wilhelm I was pronounced German Emperor in the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles exactly 170 years after Prussia became a kingdom. A new and powerful German empire fell upon Europe. King Wilhelm actually saw this as the death of Prussia, and took the title, Emperor of Germany, under protest and duress. However,



Figure 2 *Otto von Bismarck escorts Emperor Napoleon III.* Painting by Wilhelm Camphausen, c. 1877. *Deutsches Historisches Museum* Berlin.

as Bismarck and the German people reveled in triumph, it was time to turn towards domestic matters.<sup>37</sup>

### **Pursuit of Domestic Policies and German Nationalism**

After his military exploits, Frederick the Great immediately set in action domestic policy reform. This solidified his essential duty as the “first servant of the State” and capitalized on his territorial gains.<sup>38</sup> Frederick the Great inherited an incredible “framework of centralized institutions,”<sup>39</sup> and his policies did not significantly change Prussia’s internal framework. Where he absolutely excelled

was through his constant determination that forced change through the realigned powerbase he created. Power shifted away from his ministers and advisors and fell directly into his own hands, ensuring any changes he wanted underwent immediate implementation.<sup>40</sup> This helps explain another Frederick nickname, “The Enlightened Despot.” Frederick then turned his same aggressive behavior from military action to domestic reform, feeling that he knew what was best for Prussia, and that he was best serving his country by forcing change. His constant studies of the Enlightenment and Parisian culture greatly influenced the changes he felt bettered the state and the people. Thus, only those ideals emerging from the Enlightenment he felt benefited Prussia, without challenging his rule openly, existed within the Prussian Kingdom.

Just as Bismarck later embraced state socialist ideals as a means of maximizing the output of goods and services, Frederick preceded this concept by setting in motion his own methods of economic reforms. He maintained an army primarily consisting of foreign fighters. He believed the duty and responsibility of the people of Prussia was to increase the state’s wealth via industry and trade.<sup>41</sup> Immediately following the final years of conflict, 1778 and 1784, Frederick created the *Fürstenbund* ([German] League of Princes), establishing himself as protector of the German states, and by extension, Prussian livelihood. Frederick proved his ability to manage domestic finances, and brought Prussian currency back to its pre-war value. In 1765, he founded the Royal Bank of Berlin, a national Prussian bank with a capital of 400,000 *talers* specifically to recover from the conflict. By 1786, this bank enjoyed an annual profit of 22,000 *talers*.<sup>42</sup>

This economic feat dovetailed with his vision for industrialization. Under Frederick’s leadership, Prussia became the fourth largest manufacturing country in the world. The manufacturing gains stemmed directly from Frederick’s ban on import items and a greater concentration on quick crop farming, sheep farming, wool export, mining of mineral resources, and foresting for shipbuilding. He was also quick to include Silesia into his reforms. By 1783, the Prussian manufacturing sector was worth twenty-nine million *talers* per year. Eleven million of this was from Silesia alone.<sup>43</sup> Prosperity through industrialization and economic reform was just one way Frederick solidified his plan for Prussian greatness. Although outside the scope of this essay, Frederick’s liberal religious policies, his recognition of architecture, music, arts, and education all deserve further research. They illustrate the domestic reforms that enhanced Frederick’s goal of a true European power.

Bismarck also inherited many in-place policies that he merely expanded upon after creating a monopoly of power over administrators and king's advisors. Before Bismarck finalized consolidation of the German Empire, the new German Reich and its satellites enjoyed the *Zollverein*, which was generically, 'a policy of free trade'.<sup>44</sup> However, with a European economic downturn upon him, Bismarck saw the need for economic reforms that would strengthen the state and serve the citizens of Germany. In December 1878, he introduced his economic and tariff program that concentrated on indirect taxation and called for a general tariff on all imports. This complete reversal of the *Zollverein* was akin to Frederick's ban on imports. He then added to the tariffs a protectionist duty imposed on all domestic corn and most other agriculture products. He was instituting protectionism and by proxy served as 'a servant' to the agrarian workers of the state.<sup>45</sup>

This program was not overly popular in parliamentary circles, specifically the National Liberal Party. Bismarck successfully implemented the "iron and rye" tariff, along with other similar protectionist policies that curbed the shortage of German capital as compared to its abundance in land and labor. This protectionism was essentially the death knell for economic liberalism and pushed Germany towards state socialism.<sup>46</sup> Historian William Harbutt Dawson, in his work originally published in 1891, viewed Bismarck's reforms as simple extensions of the regime a century earlier:

Prince Bismarck has done nothing more than develop the social and political system established by the Great Elector, Frederick [Wilhelm] I, and Frederick the Great of Prussia. He has taken up the threads of policy which were laid down ... and has endeavored to infuse the spirit of the old Prussian Monarchy into the new German Empire.<sup>47</sup>

It is debatable whether Bismarck was closing the cycle begun a century earlier or acting on his own, but it is undeniable that his use of *Realpolitik*, or the robust use of politics and power for material interest, was *the* reason that Germany saw a massive economic boom post-1879.<sup>48</sup>

Bismarck's support of the working class, or the laborer's "Right to Work" (*Recht auf Arbeit*), became stronger still after 1884 when he put forth further measures that echoed the Prussia of an earlier century. The idea of Prussian common law, or *Landrecht*, started with Frederick William, the Great Elector, but was completed by his grandson, Frederick the Great. It was instituted in 1794. Essentially, it "discourage[d] idleness, recognize[d] the right of every citizen to

work, and proclaims the State to be the natural protector of the poorer classes.”<sup>49</sup> In an address to the Reichstag in 1882, Bismarck himself remarked that his policy of protectionism for the worker and the state was just “a reversion to the traditional Prussian policy,”<sup>50</sup> no doubt an ode to the man whose blueprint he had been following since his initial rise to power as the Minister-President.

Consciously or not, Otto von Bismarck’s rise to power and his vision of reestablishing a great Prussia came by way of continuing Frederick the Great’s path and policies. Dr. John Lord, a historian from the nineteenth century remarked, “Bismarck is the sequel and sequence of Frederic.”<sup>51</sup> From the outset, both men felt constrained by the precarious position of Prussia sitting in Central Europe surrounded by strong potential enemies. In addition, both men believed the initial threat was Austria, in particular, from its influence on the German states that comprised the rest of Central Europe. Frederick and Bismarck took action through an iron will that saw the Prussian Army serve as their choice tool of foreign policy. Both waged seven years of conflict spread across three wars, and both eventually claimed victory for Prussia and promoted peaceful consolidation of their new powerful states with internal reforms.

Unfortunately, Bismarck also followed the same path as Frederick; that is, he controlled every aspect of domestic ministries and policies in isolation. All actions were a product of their will, of their powerbase—and as the first servants of the state, they both failed in grooming an heir to continue their work after they were no longer in power. Napoleon Bonaparte crushed Frederick Wilhelm III’s Prussia in 1806. Bismarck’s removal from office occurred through forced resignation on March 18, 1890 after continued differences in opinion with the new Emperor Wilhelm II. Wilhelm sought his own ‘the Great’ title and pursued an expansionistic foreign policy counter to Bismarck’s.

Just as Frederick the Great’s Prussia stumbled approximately twenty years after his death, so too did Bismarck’s. Wilhelm II abdicated his throne almost twenty years after Bismarck’s death, when the Great War ended in 1918. Thus, both *Reichs* were short. However brief their actual reign, both men revitalized Germanic fervor and nationalism across Central Europe, and both men, through personal ambition and military aggrandizement, served as the creators of the German Fatherland.<sup>52</sup> It is often quipped that Prussia was “made of man” and that later, Germany too, was a creation of man,—in this case, these ‘men’ were Frederick the Great and Otto von Bismarck.

## Notes

1. Sidney B. Fay, *The Rise of Brandenburg-Prussia to 1786*, rev. ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1966), 117; James J. Sheehan, *German History, 1770-1866* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 859.
2. William Harbutt Dawson, *Bismarck and State Socialism: An Exposition of the Social and Economic Legislation of Germany Since 1870* (1891; repr., London: Forgotten Books, 2012), 17, 21, 31, 92.
3. John Breuilly, *Nineteenth-Century Germany: Politics, Culture, and Society 1780-1918* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); David G. Williamson, *Bismarck and Germany, 1862-1890*, 3rd ed. (Harlow, UK: Pearson Education Limited, 2011); James J. Sheehan, *German History, 1770-1866*; Fay, *The Rise of Brandenburg-Prussia*.
4. John Lord, *Two German Giants: Frederic the Great and Bismarck – The Founder and The Builder of German Empire* (New York: Fords, Howard, & Hurlbert, 1894).
5. H.W. Koch, *A History of Prussia* (New York: Dorset Press, 1987), 104; Sheehan, *German History, 1770-1866*, 859.
6. Karin Friedrich, *Brandenburg-Prussia, 1466-1806* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 90.
7. Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 12.
8. Ibid., 13.
9. Friedrich, *Brandenburg-Prussia, 1466-1806*, 30 & 89.
10. Dennis Showalter, *Frederick the Great, A Military History* (London: Front Line Books, 2012), ix.
11. Fay and Epstein, *The Rise of Brandenburg-Prussia*, 101.
12. Ibid., 111.
13. Koch, *A History of Prussia*, 114.
14. John Breuilly, "Revolution to unification" in *19th Century Germany: Politics, Culture, and Society 1780-1918*, ed., John Breuilly (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 143-144.
15. Sheehan, *German History, 1770-1866*, 854.
16. Dennis Showalter, *Frederick the Great*, 28-29; James Charles Roy, *The Vanished Kingdom: Travels through the History of Prussia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), 173.
17. David G. Williamson, *Bismarck and Germany*, 19-20.
18. Ibid., 125.

19. Ibid., 20.
20. John Breuilly, *Austria, Prussia and Germany, 1806-1871* (Harlow, UK: Pearson Education Limited, 2002), 48-49.
21. James J. Sheehan, *German History, 1770-1866*, 890-891.
22. Ibid., 880.
23. Ibid., 894.
24. Ibid., 896.
25. Ibid., 905-907.
26. Ibid., 908-909.
27. Williamson, *Bismarck and Germany*, 95.
28. Koch, *A History of Prussia*, 260; Roy, *The Vanished Kingdom*, 34-36.
29. Koch, *A History of Prussia*, 260-261.
30. Showalter, *Frederick the Great*, 145.
31. Koch, *A History of Prussia*, 261.
32. Erich Eyck, *Bismarck and the German Empire* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1964), 160. The first quote is attributed directly to Bismarck by the author; the second quote is from the author himself.
33. Ibid., 148-149.
34. Ibid., 156.
35. Ibid., 173.
36. Koch, *A History of Prussia*, 266-269.
37. Ibid.
38. Fay and Epstein, *The Rise of Brandenburg-Prussia*, 102.
39. Ibid., 119.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., 121.
42. Ibid., 122.
43. Ibid., 122-123.
44. Eyck, *Bismarck and the German Empire*, 227.

- 45. Ibid., 253-255.
- 46. Dawson, *Bismarck and State Socialism*, 45.
- 47. Ibid., 15.
- 48. Eyck, *Bismarck and the German Empire*, 259-261.
- 49. Ibid., 19.
- 50. Ibid., 21.
- 51. Lord, *Two German Giants*, 32.
- 52. Ibid., iv



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